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Rituals – ceremonies of birth, death, marriage, initiation, healing, harvest, 
religious observance – are found in all known cultures, and appear to have been 
performed for tens of thousands of years.  They speak to people’s core emotions and 
reveal values that a society holds dearest.  Since their expression is conventional and 
obligatory, they join the individual in solidarity with the group.  As such, they are part of 
a society’s “essential constitution.”2
These general functions of ritual reveal an obvious similarity to law.  Law also 
joins the individual in solidarity with the group.  It also imposes on people certain 
conventional and obligatory forms of behavior.  And, like ritual, law is part of the 
essential constitution of human societies – a set of shared understandings about how 
political power is to be allocated among, and exercised by, the members of a given social 
organization.
In some respects, rituals also resemble social norms – forms of rule-governed 
behavior that are defined and enforced outside the formal legal system.3  Like both rituals 
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2 Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure 6 (1969)(quoting Monica Wilson, 
Nyakyusa Ritual and Symbolism, 56 American Anthropologist 241 (1954)).
3 Rituals bear an obvious relationship to norms, and can even be conceived of as forms of norms.  
See Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 233-234 (1991)(discussing 
3and laws, norms control behavior, at least in the sense that if a person does not conform 
to a norm, he or she is likely to experience a sanction.   Because norms are socially 
constructed, moreover, they join the individual to the group.  And although some social 
norms may not appear basic to the organization of society (for example, rules of etiquette 
at the dinner table), others are fundamental (for example, norms against incest or murder). 
Rituals, norms, and laws thus appear to share some common functions, even if 
their modes of expression are distinct.  The aim of this paper is to draw out some 
elements of that common purpose.4  The general thesis is that rituals, like laws and 
norms, control behavior by encouraging beneficial actions and discouraging harmful 
ones.5  The role of ritual in influencing behavior in the service of an ostensibly broader 
“constitutive norms” that hold groups together).  David Garland describes rituals as a “specific kind of 
normative event, a collective means of enacting and affirming certain norms, values and social 
relationships.”  David Garland, Private Correspondence, Feb. 20, 2001.  For Garland, rituals are “one of the 
modes whereby norms are upheld, not a category of controls that is separate from norms.”  Id.  Despite the 
undeniably close relationship between rituals and norms, however, the two modes of social action can 
usefully be distinguished.  Rituals do not generally set forth particular rules or standards for behavior, but 
rather define social roles within which people are expected to act.  While these roles may generate 
regularities of behavior that resemble norms, they operate differently and have application to a broader 
category of life situations.  Norms, we might say, define how one ought to act in particular settings; rituals 
define how one ought to be.  
4 The relationship between ritual, norms and law is virtually unexplored in the legal literature.  An 
interesting exception is Andrew J. Cappel, Bringing Cultural Practice into Law: Ritual and Social Norms, 
43 Santa Clara Law Review 389 (2003).  Cappel’s paper investigates the role of ritual in defining, 
stabilizing, and enhancing compliance with social norms.  The present paper takes a different approach, 
conceiving of ritual as mechanisms for aligning individual identities with social roles.
5 Several qualifications to the theory should be noted at the outset.  First, discussion of “ritual” in the 
abstract cannot encompass the richness and variety of meanings that a given institution may possess in its 
specific cultural setting.  Rituals are complexly orchestrated performances, often extending over substantial 
reaches of space or time, and including many participants, multiple perspectives, and various media of 
expression.  An adequate understanding of any particular ritual requires that it be examined as a whole and 
considered in its unique social setting.  Nevertheless, so long as the limitations on the project are kept in 
mind, cross-cultural comparisons can be useful.  See Paul B. Roscoe, “Initiation” in Cross-Cultural 
Perspective, in Nancy C. Lutkehaus and Paul B. Roscoe, eds., Gender Rituals: Female Initiation in 
Melanesia 219-238 (1995)(contrasting comparativist and interpretive positions in contemporary 
anthropology, and endorsing a qualified version of the comparativist approach which admits the possibility 
of cross-cultural comparisons).
Second, in emphasizing the legal function of ritual, I do not deny the many other functions that 
rituals can also perform.  Like other forms of human conduct, rituals can have multiple causes and serve 
multiple ends. Rituals may contribute to the creation of a sense of a meaningful universe in which people 
live; permit people to manage ambiguities in social life; operate as arenas in which people negotiate social 
4good can be termed its “legal function” – where the idea of law is employed generally to 
describe attempts by the broader society, enforced if necessary by compulsion, to impose 
social controls on individual behavior.6
As a mechanism for social control, ritual can be contrasted with laws and norms. 
Laws exert their coercive influence largely through the force of state action – police, 
prosecutors, courts, prisons, etc.  Norms compel observance principally by means of 
extra-legal social sanctions such as rebuking, shaming, gossiping, or shunning.7  For 
ritual, the coercive force is exercised, not chiefly through ex post sanctions, but rather 
through the ex ante technique of assigning social roles to individuals and inducing them 
and others to accept the roles thus assigned as natural and appropriate.  For the ritual 
relationships; alleviate anxieties about unknown or uncontrollable threats; facilitate communication between 
individuals and spiritual forces or beings; enhance and dignify stages of human development; provide 
structures of legitimacy that can be appropriated or otherwise manipulated by political groups; reduce 
stress; or simply provide a satisfying aesthetic experience.
Third, I do not mean to imply that the behaviors associated with ritual can be simplistically 
separated from other aspects of life.  Most contemporary social theorists dispute the possibility of such a 
separation.  See Pierre Bordieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977); Pierre Bordieu, The Logic of 
Practice (1990); Gilbert Lewis, Day of Shining Red: An Essay on Understanding Ritual 6 (1980); Godfrey 
Leinhardt, Divinity and Experience: The Religion of the Dinka (1961); T.O. Beidelman, Some Sociological 
Implications of Culture, in J.C. McKenney and E.A. Tiryakian, eds., Theoretical Sociology: Perspectives 
and Developments (1970).  
Fourth, in arguing that rituals serve a legal function, I do not claim that they will always be 
beneficial.  Although survival of a ritual through extended periods of time suggests that it has good effects, 
some rituals may be neutral or even harmful from a social point of view.  See, e.g., Robert M. Keesing, 
Introduction, in Gilbert H. Herdt, ed., Rituals of Manhood: Male Initiation in Papua New Guinea 23 
(1998)(arguing that male initiation rites in Papua New Guinea, by reinforcing strong conceptions of male 
dominance, may have harmful effects not only for women, but for the society as a whole).
6 I will not attempt to provide a formal definition of ritual – a subject that has troubled 
anthropologists for generations.  I have in mind the kind of social performances that nearly all observers 
would agree possess the characteristics of ritual, without worrying too much about where the line between 
ritual and non-ritual is drawn in doubtful cases.
7 People may also “internalize” norms, although this proposition is disputed. Eric Posner gives little 
scope to internalized norms, relying instead on self-interest as an explanation for cooperative behavior.  
See, e.g., Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms (2000).  Robert Cooter, on the other hand, places greater 
emphasis on internalization. Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 Cornell Law Review 947 
(1997).  Richard McAdams recognizes that both internalization and self-interest play a role.  See Richard 
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 Michigan Law Review 338 (1997).  As 
to internalization of laws as a reason for compliance, see Tom Tyler, Why People Obey the Law
(1990)(except when expected sanctions are severe, legal obedience is largely a function of perceived 
legitimacy of the law).
5subject, this process consists of causing the person to identify subjectively with the social 
role to which he or she is assigned.  For others, the process consists of publicly 
identifying the ritual subject as constituted by the social role.  In either case, people act in 
role-appropriate ways, not only because they fear external sanctions for deviating from 
the social role, but also because it would be painful to act otherwise.8
The mechanism by which rituals affect behavior offers certain advantages and 
disadvantages as compared with laws and norms.  Since rituals shape identity, they do not 
require the costly mechanisms of enforcement that are part of the apparatus of the law.  
Nor do rituals need the level of private enforcement required for social norms.9  To the 
extent they are successful at shaping identities, rituals are largely self-enforcing.  On the 
other hand, rituals require large expenditures in the service of shaping identity.  Laws and 
social norms, in contrast, require lower expenditures for their creation.  Compared with 
other forms of social control, rituals are cheap ex post but costly ex ante.
This theory of ritual supports several conjectures about the conditions in which 
ritual will assume social importance compared with other forms of social control.  A 
given society is likely, in some rough sense, to adopt a mix of rituals, norms, and laws 
that maximizes the surplus of social benefits over social costs.  Other things equal, a 
society is likely to employ relatively more ritual if it is small, homogenous, and insulated 
8 Rituals are not unique, of course, in shaping identities and thereby controlling behavior.  All sorts 
of socialization techniques (parenting, schools, religious instruction etc.) serve a similar function, as do 
broader social institutions in which people function in their daily lives, such as popular culture and even 
language itself.  However, rituals supplement these other types of identity-formation mechanisms.  Given 
the importance, and indeed pervasiveness, of ritual in many human cultures, it appears that ritual may offer 
something that other forms of socialization cannot perfectly emulate.
9 This is not to say, of course, that private enforcement of ritually-prescribed roles is unimportant; a 
person who fails to live up to the requirements of a social role is likely to experience significant private 
sanctions for his or her default.  However, if ritual is generally successful at aligning personal identities with 
social roles, these sanctions should not usually be needed.
6from technological or economic shocks.  Societies are likely to employ less ritual if they 
are large, diverse, and rapidly evolving. Very few societies, however, will opt for 
exclusive reliance on a single form of social control: the vast majority will employ some 
mix of laws, norms, and rituals.
This paper is structured as follows.  Part I outlines the theory.  Part II examines 
three categories of ritual: rituals of reformation (initiation, marriage, and installation), 
renewal (services, patriotic ceremonies, and sacrifice), and restoration (confession, 
purification, and cure).  Part III compares ritual with laws and norms as mechanisms for 
social control.  I end with a brief conclusion.
I.  Theory
A.  Ritual as Social Control
For societies to function cooperatively, it is helpful if people are able to rely on 
one another without having to monitor the other’s behavior closely or to line up backup 
plans in the event that a partner defaults on some obligation or promise.  The process 
often requires that people expose themselves to harm by taking actions in reliance on the 
other’s actions.  Executory contracts, in which one party performs before the other, 
provide an obvious example, but the phenomenon is much broader.  We rely on others all 
the time outside the contractual setting.10  The ability to depend on others to follow basic 
cooperative norms is part of the glue that holds society together.  But people often have 
an incentive to defect from these cooperative behaviors.  If they have more to gain by 
defecting than by cooperating, they may not turn out to be reliable.  And if many people 
defected, everyone – even the defectors – would be worse off in the long run.
7The dynamic processes of defection and cooperation are modeled, in modern 
economic and social theory, in the classic problem of the prisoner’s dilemma. 11   Two 
suspects accused of committing a crime are separately interrogated.  If neither confesses, 
both will go free.  If both confess, each will serve some time in prison (say, six years).  If 
one confesses and the other doesn’t, the one who confesses will serve only a short 
sentence (say, one year), but the one who doesn’t confess will serve a long term (say, 
twenty years).  In such a situation, it is in the joint interest of both prisoners to claim 
innocence – i.e., to “cooperate.”  However, each knows that if he claims innocence and 
the other confesses, he faces twenty years in jail.  He can avoid the twenty years by 
confessing (“defecting”), which will guarantee a term of only six years.  If the prisoners 
don’t trust one another, each will confess, resulting in an outcome which is worse for 
both than what could have been accomplished by cooperating.
The prisoner’s dilemma conundrum illustrates one aspect of a basic problem of 
social organization.  The tiny society of two prisoners could be improved if each could 
make a reliable commitment to the other, before being interrogated, that he will not 
confess.  What is true for the prisoners also holds in many more general contexts.  It is 
often the case that everyone can be made better off if people make credible commitments 
ex ante to cooperate with one another – even though, ex post, it may turn out to be in a 
person’s interest to defect.  In the absence of transactions costs, people could and would 
make all possible mutually beneficial commitments, and all such commitments would in 
fact be honored.  However, in the real world, transactions costs are large, and 
10 When we ask for directions, for example, we do so with a fairly high degree of confidence that our 
informants will not deliberately mislead us.
11 On the prisoner’s dilemma, see generally Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984).  
8enforcement of individual contracts is uncertain.  We cannot rely on individual 
contracting to achieve a desirable level of commitment to socially beneficial conduct.  
Societies therefore supply institutions which, in rough fashion, substitute for the 
commitments that it would be rational for people to make in the ideal, but impossible 
world of zero transactions costs.  
Law is one such institution.  It is a form of social control, imposed by human 
beings on other human beings, and justified as necessary or desirable as a means for 
advancing the general good.  A principal function of law is to deter opportunistic 
behavior that serves the interest of individuals at the expense of the society as a whole 
(such as theft, fraud, or breach of contract).  This concept of law has influenced thinking 
about law for many years.12
Norms can also be understood as institutions for social control.  The study of 
these informal mechanisms has recently emerged on the cutting edge of legal theory, 
through the work of scholars such as Lisa Bernstein,13 Robert Cooter,14 Robert 
Ellickson,15 Dan Kahan,16 Lawrence Lessig,17 Richard McAdams,18 Eric Posner,19
12 The perspective of law as social control is associated most prominently with Roscoe Pound.  See 
Roscoe Pound, Social Control Through Law (1997; first published 1942).  But Oliver Wendell Holmes, the 
Legal Realists, and many others also endorsed variants of this view.  The perspective on law as social 
control can be traced at least back to Edward A. Ross, a mentor of Pound’s whose work, now largely 
forgotten, was influential in the early part of the Twentieth Century.  See Edward A. Ross, Social Control 
(1901). 
13 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the 
Diamond Industry, 21 Journal of Legal Studies 115 (1992).
14 See Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 Cornell Law Review 947 (1997).
15 See Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991). 
16 Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 Journal of Legal Studies 
609 (1998); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 University of Virginia 
Law Review 349 (1997).
17 Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
2181 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 University of Chicago Law Review 
943 (1995).
9Richard Posner,20 Richard Epstein,21 Paul Mahoney and Chris Sanchirico,22 Cass 
Sunstein23 and others.  Each of these writers, in different ways, recognizes that people can 
be motivated to behave in socially desirable ways through means other than the threat of 
formal legal sanction.24  Especially in close-knit communities, where people interact with 
one another on a repeated basis, social norms can supply an effective framework for 
action that preserves the social fabric and controls the propensity for self-interested 
behavior.25
 In this paper, I analyze ritual as a form of social control similar to, although 
distinct from, the domains of law and norms.  Long a principal focus of research in the 
fields of anthropology, psychology, sociology, and comparative religion,26 ritual appears 
18 Richard McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and 
Race Discrimination, 108 Harvard Law Review 1003 (1995); Richard McAdams, The Origin, 
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 Michigan Law Review 338 (1997).
19 See, Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms (2000); Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social 
Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 Journal of Legal Studies 765 (1998); Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of 
Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 University of Chicago 
Law Review 133 (1996); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1697 (1996).
20 See, e.g., Richard Posner, Social Norms and the Law, American Economic Review (May, 1997).  
Posner’s earlier work on primitive law should also be mentioned in this context. See Richard A. Posner, The 
Economics Of Justice 174-206 (1981).
21 Richard A. Epstein, The Path to the T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of 
Tort, 21 Journal of Legal Studies 1 (1992).
22 Paul Mahoney and Chris Sanchirico, Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm 
Efficient? (draft 2000).
23 Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Rules, 96 Columbia Law Review 903 (1996).
24 Not all these scholars, however, would endorse the proposition that social norms are beneficial for 
society overall.
25 The effect of norms is not limited to close-knit communities, however.  See Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Norm Enforcement in the Public Sphere: the Case of Handicapped Parking, , 71 George Washington Law 
Review 895-933 (2004).
26 William Robertson Smith, Émile Durkheim, and Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss provided early 
grounding in the nature and functional importance of ritual.  See William Robertson Smith, Lectures on the 
Religion of the Semites: The Fundamental Institutions (1969)(emphasizing the centrality of ritual in 
religious life); Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (Karen E. Fields, tr. 
1995)(emphasizing the role of ritual at organizing human relationships); Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, 
Sacrifice: Its Nature and Function (1964)(viewing sacrificial rituals as means by which people could 
communicate with and in some sense control divine forces). Alfred R. Radcliffe-Brown, following 
Durkheim, added important insights in the 1940s and 1950s.  See Alfred R. Radcliffe-Brown, The Andaman 
Islanders (1948); Alfred R. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society (1956). More 
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on the surface to be far removed from legal theory.  Because ritual does not ordinarily 
establish general rules of behavior (other than rules for the proper conduct of the ritual 
itself), it does not appear similar to laws or norms.  Ritual appears rather to be a matter 
for private conscience, for spirituality, and for placing the participant in contact with 
unseen or transcendental forces.  Notwithstanding its apparently unusual or esoteric 
content, however, ritual is very much of a part the overall project of social control. 
Rituals control behavior by (1) defining social roles; (2) assigning social roles to 
individuals according to some principle of attribution; (3) demanding that the assignees 
conform their personal identities with the social roles so assigned; and (4) encouraging 
others to identify and treat the assignees as constituted by the role.27  Because they shape 
recent scholars – Victor Turner, Jonathan Z. Smith, René Girard, Walter Burkert, and Maurice Bloch, 
among others – have extended, and in some respects revised, the work of these pioneers. See Victor Turner, 
The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (1969); Jonathan Z. Smith, The Domestication of 
Sacrifice, in Robert G. Hamerton-Kelly, Violent Origins 191-205 (1987); Jonathan Z. Smith, Map is Not 
Territory: Studies in the History of Religions (1978); Jonathan Z. Smith, To Take Place: Towards Theory in 
Ritual (1987); René Girard, Violence and the Sacred (1977); Walter Burkert, Homo Necans: The 
Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth  (1983); Walter Burkert, Creation of the 
Sacred: Tracks of Biology in Early Religions (1996); Maurice Bloch, From Blessing to Violence: History 
and Ideology of the Circumcision Ritual of the Merina of Madagascar (1986); Maurice Bloch, Prey Into 
Hunter (1992).
The notion that rituals relate the individual to the society has a long provenance in anthropology.  
Durkheim, for example, argued that rituals strengthen the bonds attaching the individual to society. Émile 
Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life  (Karen E. Fields, Tr. 1995).  Radcliffe-Brown 
expressed a similar view when he commented that ritual maintains “a certain system of sentiments by which 
the conduct of the individual is regulated in conformity with the needs of the society.” Alfred R. Radcliffe-
Brown, The Andaman Islanders 233-34 (1948).  These scholars and their successors, however, have not 
employed the methodology of contemporary legal theory and have not developed a theory of ritual as social 
control along the lines set forth below.
27 For discussions of the identity-shaping function of ritual, see, e.g., Michio Kitahara, A Function of 
Marriage Ceremony, 16 Anthropologica 163 (1974); Fitz John Porter Poole, The Ritual Forging of Identity: 
Aspects of Person and Self in Bimin-Kuskusmin Male Initiation, in Gilbert H. Herdt, ed., Rituals of 
Manhood: Male Initiation in Papua New Guinea (1998); N.D. Munn, Symbolism in a Ritual Context: 
Aspects of Symbolic Action, in J.J. Honigmann, ed, Handbook of Social and Cultural Anthropology 579-
612 (1973); Evan M. Zuesse, Meditation on Ritual, 43 Journal of the American Academy of Religion 517-
53, 524 (1975)(“an identity that is built up through actions and the interconnections with an environment is 
one that requires ritual to the same degree that it requires a meaningfully structured cosmos.”)  Radcliffe-
Brown also appears to have endorsed some version of the identity-formation theory of ritual, although he 
was not particularly explicit on this point.   See Alfred R. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in 
Primitive Society 146 (1956)(noting that rituals “serve to regulate and refine human emotions” and adding 
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identity, rituals “transform people.”28 If they are successful, rituals produce not just a 
temporary emotion or catharsis, but rather a permanent change in identity conforming to 
the society’s expectations of right conduct.  Suitably transformed, people fulfill the social 
expectations coded in ritual, not only to avoid sanctions from others, but also – even 
primarily – because acting in a socially appropriate manner is consistent with the person 
they experience themselves to be. If they did not behave according to the role, they would 
experience emotions signaling a violation of identity: disgust, shame, guilt, anxiety or 
horror.29  To avoid these painful feelings, and to experience the pleasurable sense of 
felicity that comes with acting consistently with one’s sense of identity, people conform 
their behaviors to the dictates of the social role.30  At the same time, others in the society 
are encouraged, by ritual, to identify the subject with the social role, and thus to treat him 
or her in a role-appropriate fashion.  Because ritual exercises a powerful influence over 
behaviors, it is appropriately conceived of as a form of social control.
that “partaking in the performance of these rites serves to cultivate in the individual sentiments on whose 
existence the social order itself depends.”)
28 Bruce Lincoln, Emerging from the Chrysalis: Studies of Rituals of Women’s Initiation 6 (1981).
29 For an economic expression of the concept that personal identity can overcome the prisoners 
dilemma problem, see Amartya Sen, Goals, Commitment, and Identity, 1 Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization 341 (1985).  In conceptually related work, Robert H. Frank argues that certain emotions serve 
as “pre-commitment” devices that deter people from acting in ways that serve their own self-interest at the 
expense of the society as a whole.  See Robert H. Frank, Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the 
Emotions (1988).
30 On social roles, see Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 909 
(1996).  By “social role,” I mean some relatively general set of expectations, believes, values, attitudes and 
behaviors to which a person who is assigned a particular label by the culture is expected to conform.  There 
are obviously significant differences among different roles.  Some roles are relatively permanent – for 
example, being a man or a woman.  Some are temporary – for example, being homecoming queen, or vice 
president for marketing.  Some are pervasive in a person’s life – being married to someone, or being a 
priest.  Others are less integral – being a member of the local library board.  Not all roles are implemented 
by rituals, but rituals do appear to exercise an important function when the social role in question is long-
lasting and integral in a person’s life.  I thank Eric Posner for stimulating thoughts, in private 
correspondence, about the nature of social roles and ritual.
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B.  How Rituals Shape Identity
Many of the distinctive features of ritual can be understood as serving the 
functions of shaping identities.
Rituals, together perhaps with associated myths,31 offer a model of reality through 
which individuals can understand themselves.32  Through the performance of the ritual, 
people come to accept the model and to conceptualize their own identities, as well as the 
identities of others, within its terms.  When they thereafter view the world through the 
ritual framework, they see confirmation in the external world of the equation of personal 
identity with social role.  They are more likely to experience themselves and others as 
constituted by the social roles and to act accordingly.
Rituals provide reference to ideal situations to which people aspire.  Rituals 
illustrate the way things ought to be,33 and thereby supply a moral framework to guide 
people’s understanding of their lives.  Seeing the world through the moral framework, 
people then experience the roles assigned to them and others through the ritual process as 
just, fair, and appropriate.
Ritual shapes identity through drama.34  Because one participates in rituals, rather 
than merely observes, one loses the protective distance between self and other, observer 
31 The relationship between myth and ritual has perplexed anthropologists for years, and probably 
will never admit a generally recognized explanation.  That some relationship exists between the two, 
however, is beyond dispute.  For discussion, see Catherine Bell, Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions 5-8 
(1997).  
32 See Andrew J. Cappel, Bringing Cultural Practice into Law: Ritual and Social Norms, 43 Santa 
Clara Law Review 389, 446 (2003) (describing how ritual facilitates the social construction of reality).
33 See Jonathan Z. Smith.  See, e.g., Jonathan Z. Smith, To Take Place: Towards Theory in Ritual 
111 (1987).
34 A point stressed by Robertson Smith, who consistently maintained that the participatory element 
was central to the institution of ritual.  See William Robertson Smith, Lectures on the Religion of the 
Semites: The Fundamental Institutions (1969).
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and observed. 35   Rituals thus speak to the “whole person” and not just the cognitive 
mind.36  By enacting instead of simply observing the ritual, a person comes to own its 
message as part of his or her sense of self.  Participants, moreover, feel a certain sense of 
responsibility for the ritual’s success – feelings that can facilitate identification with the 
ritual and acceptance of the social roles that the ritual process assigns to the participant 
and others.
Rituals are enacted at key transitions in the person’s life when he or she is likely 
to be receptive to influences on identity.  These transitions include life crises such as 
birth, childhood, puberty, betrothal, marriage, pregnancy, parenthood, or death of a loved 
one.37  People are likely to be more receptive to influence in these situations because the 
circumstances tend to be charged with emotion, and because these are occasions where 
identities are changing in any event.
Rituals command attention.38  They do so through devices such as hypnotic 
intonations, sacred music, silence, synchronized actions, and emphasis on precision.  
Space is also important.  The architecture of ritual can act as a “focusing lens,” 
establishing the possibility of significance by “directing attention” in a specially 
pronounced way.39  Rituals also command attention through what is taboo or prohibited: 
by declaring what must not be done, they demand that participants concentrate intensely 
35 See Andrew J. Cappel, Bringing Cultural Practice into Law: Ritual and Social Norms, 43 Santa 
Clara Law Review 389, 435 (2003) (“ritual performance firmly fixes cultural models in the minds of the 
participants in a much more unmediated and less ambiguous manner than ordinary processes of 
communication and social practice, because it can act directly upon the basic cognitive components of 
comprehension.”) 
36 Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure 43 (1969).
37 A point stressed in the foundational work of van Gennep.  See Arnold van Gennep, The Rites of 
Passage 3 (1960).
38 See Jonathan Z. Smith, To Take Place: Towards Theory in Ritual 103 (1987)(“Ritual is, first and 
foremost, a mode of paying attention.”)
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on their behavior within the ritual frame. Even the apparently irrational or nonsensical 
aspects of rituals may focus the mind.40  Because people try to make sense of the world 
around them, the nonsensical element stimulates increased attention to the process.41
Participants become “totally immersed in the proper execution of their complex tasks.”42
With greater attention comes an enhanced probability that the ritual will impress itself on 
the person in some fundamental way.
Rituals use all available media and communicative strategies – songs, chanting, 
drumming, poetry, dance, costume, stories, humor, processions, drama, jokes, sports, 
lighting, speeches, shouting, cursing, taste, scent, touch, pageantry, symbolism, 
divination, trance and more – as a means for reaching the individual through all available 
sensory and cognitive inputs.43
Rituals, moreover, require that participants engage in actions of their bodies rather 
than their minds alone.44  People must stand, sit, march, and dance.  Rituals thus create a 
nonverbal impression on the individual that is retained in the body in the form of muscle 
memory.
39 Jonathan Z. Smith, To Take Place: Towards Theory in Ritual 104 (1987).
40 See Fritz Staal, Rules without Meaning: Ritual, Mantras and the Human Sciences (1969); Fritz 
Staal, The Meaninglessness of Ritual, 26 Numen 2-22 (1975).
41 See Gilbert Lewis, Day of Shining Red: An Essay on Understanding Ritual 19-20 
(1980)(discussing the “alerting” quality of ritual); Harvey Whitehouse, Rites of Terror: Emotion, Metaphor 
and Memory in Melanesian Initiation Cults, 2 Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 703-715 
(1996)(describing how a “cognitive crisis” resulting from upheaval of everyday understandings results in 
long-term mnemonic effect).
42 Fritz Staal, The Meaninglessness of Ritual, 26 Numen 2-22, 3 (1975).
43 See, e.g., S.J. Tambiah, A Performative Approach to Ritual, 65 Proceedings of the British 
Academy 113 (1979)(discussing how media are combined in ritual).
44 See Andrew J. Cappel, Bringing Cultural Practice into Law: Ritual and Social Norms, 43 Santa 
Clara Law Review 389, 463 (2003) (ritual “inevitably” involves physical performance).  In this respect 
ritual differs from myth, which does not require bodily movements for its performance.   See Evan M. 
Zuesse, Meditation on Ritual, 43 Journal of the American Academy of Religion 517-530, 518 (1975).
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Rituals often occur outside of the usual framework of time and space.45  The 
various sensory inputs that normally situate a person in his or her environment are 
removed. Because the person is deprived of experiential anchors, he or she is likely to be 
more susceptible to being impressed by the ritual at a basic level of identity. 
Rituals also remove social anchors.  They take participants outside the ordinary 
play of the social order.  In many religious services, all worshippers are equal, at least in 
theory, no matter what their relationships of hierarchy, status and kinship in the outside 
world.  In initiations, novices may be placed in an unstructured egalitarian community in 
which ordinary status relationships are absent.46 By creating a radically unfamiliar social 
environment, unstructured by ordinary relationships of social status, ritual opens 
participants to the possibility of basic change in personal identity.
Language reinforces this sense of separation.  Ritual speech tends to be inflated
and formalized.  People use a different vocabulary during rituals and speak in unusual 
tones of voice.  The speech patterns found in ritual both emphasize to participants the 
importance of the process and highlight the separation of the ritual process from ordinary 
social interactions.47
Rituals often connect participants with a realm of experience or reality that is 
beyond the norm. Rituals can evoke a sense of the “sacred” higher than and separate from 
45 See Arnold van Gennep, The Rites of Passage 128 (1960)(arguing that rites of passage establish a 
“liminal” space set apart from the participants’ ordinary environment ); Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: 
Structure and Anti-Structure (1969)(utilizing and expanding on Van Gennep’s schema). For an application, 
See, e.g., André Droogers, The Dangerous Journey: Symbolic Aspects of Boys’ Initiation Among the 
Wagenia of Kisangani, Zaire 200-207 (1980); Andrew J. Cappel, Bringing Cultural Practice into Law: 
Ritual and Social Norms, 43 Santa Clara Law Review 389, 450 (2003) (describing how rituals, by being 
performed at special sites, have the effect of breaking down geographical as well as temporal divisions).
46 See Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure 128-29 (1991).
47 See S.J. Tambiah, A Performative Approach to Ritual, 65 Proceedings of the British Academy 
113, 126 (1979).
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the material plane.48  Feelings of awe, mystery, and wonder may accompany this 
experience.49 Similarly, rituals are often experienced as deeply meaningful.50  By 
connecting people with a transcendent sense of reality and meaning, rituals encourage 
people to be open to changes in their sense of self.
Rituals impress themselves by inflicting stress. People may change basic habits 
and behaviors.  They may be required to fast or eat extravagantly.  They may abstain from 
sexual relations51 or engage in unfamiliar sexual conduct.52  They may be socially isolated 
or placed in unusual proximity with strangers.  They may ingest mind-altering drugs or 
engage in hypnotic repetitive actions.  They may be induced to experience fear, terror, and 
anxiety.53  Physical pain may be inflicted,54 and cruel forms of hazing are not 
uncommon.55  These various stresses can make the participant receptive to changes in 
identity that would not be possible if the person’s normal mechanisms for maintaining 
physical and psychological equilibrium were fully operational.  The painful or terrifying 
48 The idea that ritual connects the sacred and the profane worlds is a basic theme of Durkheim’s 
Elementary Forms of Religious Life, and is found in many studies of the ritual process conducted since.
49 John G. Galaty, Ceremony and Society: The Poetics of Maasai Ritual 18 Man 361, 380 
(1983)(rituals create a sense of mystery and “an indeterminacy and an unresolvable locus of wonder.”)
50 See, e.g., Bruce Lincoln, Emerging from the Chrysalis: Rituals of Women’s Initiation 108 
(1991)(observing that “a sense of meaning is the greatest benefit that a ritual can bestow”).   
51 See Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure 104 (1991).  
52 See Gilbert Herdt Guardians of the Flutes: Idioms of Masculinity (1981)(describing how boys 
undergoing initiation in one Papua New Guinea culture are coerced into frequent homosexual relations with 
older boys and men).
53 See Walter Burkert, Creation of the Sacred: Tracks of Biology in Early Religions 30-32 
(1996)(addressing uses of fear, terror and anxiety in religious experience); Harvey Whitehouse, Rites of 
Terror: Emotion, Metaphor and Memory in Melanesian Initiation Cults, 2 Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute 703-715 (1996)(use of fear in male initiation rites in Papua New Guinea).
54 See Alice Schlegel and Herbert Barry, III, The Evolutionary Significance of Adolescent Initiation 
Ceremonies, 7 American Ethnologist 696 (1980)(about two-thirds of boys’ initiation ceremonies and one-
third of girls’ ceremonies involved infliction of pain).
55 See, e.g., Gilbert Herdt, Fetish and Fantasy in Sambia, in Gilbert H. Herdt, ed., Rituals of 
Manhood: Male Initiation in Papua New Guinea 44, 59 (1998)(among the Sambia of Papua New Guinea, 
boys during one period of their initiation rites are beaten by switches in order to “open the skin,” pierced 
and caused to bleed profusely out of their noses, and flayed by stinging nettles).
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experiences become imprinted in the participant’s mind and remain with him or her for 
life. 
Some rituals emphasize change in identity by altering anatomy.  Male and female 
genital mutilation are examples,56 but other forms of bodily alteration are practiced –
pulling teeth, cutting fingers, piercing earlobes, severing the septum of the nose, 
tattooing, scarification, etc.   Even if the body is not altered permanently, a person’s 
appearance may be temporarily changed – he or she may wear a costume or mask, display 
a new hairstyle, or be daubed with paint, blood, or ashes.  People may be expected to 
change their facial expressions or posture.  They may be symbolically transformed, as 
among the Navaho where older women “mold” the novice by giving her a massage.57  All 
these techniques help to take the individual outside of his or her usual self, and thereby 
condition the participant to be more receptive to changes in his or her self-concept.  
Rituals are repeated many times over the course of a person’s life.  In the iterated 
performance, people enrich their experience through associated memories.  Just as a tune 
from the past can evoke bygone days, so the experience of ritual can bring a person into 
contact, through memory, with important life events and significant emotions.  Rituals 
thereby gain another, pre-reflective pathway into identity.
Rituals often establish a hierarchy ranging from highly desirable to less desirable, 
and thereby establish a kind of token economy in which people gain rewards for 
complying with social expectations.  A person starts with a less desirable role, and moves 
56 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Circumcision: A Legal-Cultural Analysis, ___ Virginia Journal of Social 
Policy and the Law ___ (2001); Female Genital Mutilation: A Cultural-Legal Analysis (manuscript 2001).
57 See Bruce Lincoln, Emerging from the Chrysalis: Studies in Rituals of Women’s Initiation 20 
(1981).
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up the social scale to new roles, gaining in the process prestige, power, and self-respect.58
By making the role to be obtained highly desirable, rituals can provide incentives to the 
individual to display the behaviors incident to that role, and to eschew behaviors 
associated with other, less-desirable roles.
Rituals provide conventional forms for expressing emotions.  People who are in 
the grip of emotion are likely to be more receptive to changes in their personal identities 
than people who are not experiencing an unusual emotional state.  By offering a channel 
through which people can experience emotions, rituals offer a framework for the 
expression of affects that appears natural and appropriate.  People who express emotion 
through ritual come to experience the framework itself as normative, and thus more 
readily accept the validity and appropriateness of the social roles prescribed by the 
process.
Further, rituals may channel and control negative emotions that are triggered by an 
adjustment in the ritual subject’s social role.  Jealousy, disappointment and envy 
frequently accompany significant status changes.  If these emotions were not allowed 
expression within the ritual frame, they could erupt in uncontrolled and dangerous ways.  
Rituals frequently allow these emotions to be expressed, and even endorse them to some 
extent, but channel them into safe modes of expression that reduces the chance that they 
will result in dangerous behaviors later on.  Others who are affected by the subject’s 
change in social status are thereby induced to act consistently with the new social roles.
58 Rituals of initiation, which provide novices with powerful incentives to aspire to initiated status, 
are classic examples.
19
C.  The Benefits and Costs of Ritual
Like all human institutions, rituals have benefits and costs.  The principal benefit 
of ritual, from the standpoint of the theory of social control, is that if successful, it 
induces people to act in ways that the society deems to be wholesome and discourages 
people from acting in ways that the society deems to be harmful.
Significant benefits of ritual are achieved through the assignment of social roles to 
individuals.  Many such roles can be defined by ritual, but some appear so frequently as 
to be nearly paradigm cases.  For example, rituals of initiation create new “adult” roles 
for novices.  Whatever their physiological status, novices are not adult from a social point 
of view until they have successfully completed the initiation.  Associated with being an 
adult, typically, is the role of gender: at the close of the initiation period, initiates are 
considered to be men or women, with different social expectations pertaining to each.  
Other roles that are commonly assigned by ritual are those of being married, being a 
warrior, being a member of some institution, being a parent, holding public office, and 
being a citizen.
Having assigned a social role, rituals prescribe behaviors appropriate to the role 
and beneficial to the society or to the group creating the ritual.  An initiated man, for 
example, may be expected to demonstrate an “exemplary moral career” and show 
“masculine virtue in strength, bravery, cunning, and stoicism.”59   An adult woman may 
be expected to display competence at the tasks of being a wife and mother.60  A married 
59 Fitz John Porter Poole, The Ritual Forging of Identity: Aspects of Person and Self in Bimin-
Kuskusmin Male Initiation, in Gilbert H. Herdt, ed., Rituals of Manhood: Male Initiation in Papua New 
Guinea 99-154, 103 (1998).
60 See, e.g., Corinne Kratz, Affecting Performance: Meaning, Movement, and Experience in Okiek 
Women’s Initiation 11 (1994).
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person may be expected to settle down, to produce children, and to restrict his or her 
sexual activities to the socially sanctioned mate.  A person who has been elevated to a 
position of responsibility may be expected to display qualities of leadership and to place 
the interests of the institution above his or her own needs or desires.  A parent may be 
expected to take responsibility for raising children.  A citizen may be expected to display 
patriotism and loyalty, and to sacrifice his or her self-interest to protect the community 
against threat. 
The social roles defined by rituals tend to be ideals, not capable of being fully 
realized by many.  But as models, they exert a powerful force shaping aspirations.  If the 
ritual process is effective at aligning individual identity and social role, people will 
display a higher degree of cooperation and a lower degree of defection from arrangements 
that often (although not always) benefit all members of a society ex ante.  
Rituals have costs as well as benefits. They can be expensive to stage.  In some 
cases, indeed, one of the functions of the ritual itself appears to be the ostentatious display 
of extravagance.61  The costs of staging a ritual include food, drink, lodging, costumes, 
adornments, facilities, entertainment, and gifts.  These costs will vary with factors such as 
the length of the ritual and the number of guests.  Rituals also impose opportunity costs –
the costs of alternative activities that are foregone by participants.62
 Ritual imposes costs that cannot be measured in financial terms.  As already 
noted, some rituals inflict physical and emotional pain.  Rituals impress themselves on a 
61 E.g., the potlatch among Indian tribes of the American Northwest.  For discussion of these and 
other conspicuous forms of ritual expenditures, see Marcel Mauss, The Gift (Ian Cunnison tr. 1967).
62 The opportunity costs of ritual are likely to be larger if the ceremony is in some sense compulsory.  
If people are forced to participate, rather than merely invited to do so, they will attend the ceremony even 
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person’s natural constitution – the set of behaviors, endowments, and gender identities 
towards which people are predisposed at birth or which they develop as a result of early 
childhood experience.  For some, the “convergence of personhood and selfhood”63 will be 
easy.  For others, the “behavioral surgery”64 needed to conform personal identity and 
social role may be more difficult.  Such individuals experience shame, guilt, and 
confusion.65  For nearly all, the process of identity-shaping contains at least some element 
of violence towards the subject.66
The costs also include the rigidities that ritual may introduce into a society, which 
may impair the society’s ability to cope effectively with exogenous shocks.67  If, for 
example, the ritual process demarcates “the special purposes to which land, or huts, or 
stock, or material objects, are put at any one moment,”68 it is unlikely that the society will 
adjust well to rapidly-changing economic or technological demands.69  Similarly, if the 
ritual process places the individual in elaborate and compulsory gift-relationships with 
when doing so requires them to sacrifice valuable alternative uses of their time.  If the ritual is not 
compulsory, people will find ways to avoid participating when attractive alternative pastimes are available.
63 Fitz John Porter Poole, The Ritual Forging of Identity: Aspects of Person and Self in Bimin-
Kuskusmin Male Initiation, in Gilbert H. Herdt, ed., Rituals of Manhood: Male Initiation in Papua New 
Guinea 104 (1998).
64 Gilbert Herdt, Guardians of the Flutes: Idioms of Masculinity 305 (1981).
65 The classic conflict in this regard is that of people whose affective preference is for people of the 
same sex, but who are expected to behave as heterosexuals in their social roles.  But the phenomenon of 
conflict between social role and personal identity is obviously much more general in scope.
66 For studies emphasizing the coercive effects of some initiation rituals, see, e.g., Audrey Richards, 
Chisungu: A Girl’s Initiation Ceremony among the Bemba of Zambia (1982); Bruce Lincoln, Emerging 
from the Chrysalis: Rituals of Women’s Initiation (1981).
67 See James Peacock, Consciousness and Change: Symbolic Anthropology in Evolutionary 
Perspective 219 (1975)(contrasting traditional ritual activity with economic modernization).
68 Max Gluckman, Les Rites de Passage, in Max Gluckman, ed., Essays on the Ritual of Social 
Relations 30 (1962).
69 See, e.g., Roy A. Rappaport, Pigs for the Ancestors: Ritual in the Ecology of a New Guinea 
People (enlarged ed. 1984)(analyzing ritual process in one New Guinea people regulates productive 
activities, such as relationships between people, pigs, and gardens, in order to preserve cultural and manage 
ecological problems).
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others, the consequence may be to reduce incentives for individual entrepreneurship in a 
developing market economy.  
Rituals may also impose costs by serving the interests of powerful groups at the 
expense of others.  For example, a ritual may perpetuate a subordinate status of women or 
persons of low status.  Some in the society may benefit from such rituals – men, or high-
caste groups – but others are harmed.  Rituals, moreover, are inherently conservative, in 
that they tend to maintain a status quo that can perpetuate relationships of dominance or 
oppression.70  The harms experienced by the subordinated group must be factored into 
any assessment of the costs of ritual in a particular society.
D.  Ritual Efficiency
We can relate these concepts of ritual benefits and costs in the notion of ritual 
efficiency.71  A ritual is socially efficient if, holding other factors constant, it (roughly) 
minimizes the sum of the costs of the ritual and the costs of not having the ritual.72  As a 
culture invests in ritual, it gains a benefit in the form of undesirable behaviors deterred or 
desirable behaviors induced.  In general, the more a society invests in ritual, the greater 
benefits it obtains.  The more elaborate the pageantry, the more extended the process, the 
70 This is a principal objection of progressive theorists such as Bruce Lincoln.  See Bruce Lincoln, 
Discourse and the Construction of Society 53-127 (1989).
71 The concept of ritual efficiency is different from that of ritual “efficacy,” which refers to the 
methods and strategies that are employed to accomplish the objectives of a ritual. See Corinne A. Kratz, 
Affecting Performance: Meaning, Movement, and Experience in Okiek Women’s Initiation 14-53
(1994)(defining ritual efficacy as “how . . . people accomplish what they say they do through ceremonies.”)  
A ritual that is efficacious, in that it successfully accomplishes its goals, would not necessarily be efficient if 
the costs of achieving the goals outweighed the benefits.
72 The model assumes that other things are equal, and thus does not here address the alternative forms 
of social control (e.g., laws and norms) that might be operative in the society.  Similarly, the model does not 
take account of other functions of ritual, besides that of social control, that might result in expenditures on 
ritual that differ from what would be optimal on these functional grounds alone.  Finally, the model assumes 
that the behaviors deterred by ritual are undesirable for the society as a whole.  In reality, some rituals serve 
the interests of powerful groups rather than the entire society.  In such a case, the ritual process might be 
efficient in terms of the powerful groups, but not for the culture as a whole.
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more intense the emotions, the larger the discomfort imposed on the participants, the 
more likely it is that the ritual will have a lasting effect.  At some point, however, the 
marginal benefit in terms of undesirable behavior deterred or desirable behavior induced 
will start to decrease, while the marginal costs of the ritual will increase.  The efficient 
point is to expend resources on ritual up to the point where the benefit of an additional 
unit of expenditure on ritual exactly equals the cost of that unit.73   Beyond this point, 
additional expenditures on ritual might further decrease undesirable behaviors or induce 
desirable ones, but the costs of doing so would outweigh the benefits. This is the point 
where the social surplus – the difference between social benefits and social costs – is 
maximized.  A society that makes efficient use of ritual will cease investing in the process 
before all undesirable behaviors are eliminated or all desirable behaviors induced.74
Whether given societies are ritually efficient, in the sense that they expend an 
optimal amount of social resources on the ritual process, is impossible to test with any 
sort of precision.  Most of the costs and benefits of ritual are not quantifiable.  Moreover, 
there is no reason to believe that every society displays ritual efficiency, and certainly 
different societies will be ritually efficient to different degrees.  Some societies may even 
be ritually dysfunctional; they will expend too much or too little on ritual, or may use 
rituals to impose roles that are not desirable from a social point of view.  We may, 
however, posit that in general societies are likely to display a tendency towards ritual 
73 This is a simple form of Gary Becker’s model of optimal law enforcement.  See Gary Becker, 
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 Journal of Political Economy 169 (1968).
74 In fact, rituals often fail to accomplish their apparent purpose.  Despite the emphasis in the 
marriage ritual on loyalty and fidelity to one’s spouse, divorce is common.  For discussions of the fact that 
rituals don’t always accomplish their intended effect, see David Garland, Punishment and Modern Society 
(1990)(analyzing failed rituals); André Droogers, The Dangerous Journey: Symbolic Aspects of Boys’ 
Initiation Among the Wagenia of Kisangani, Zaire 372 (1980)(concluding that boys’ initiation rituals 
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efficiency, since doing so will increase the wealth and stability of the society and thus 
contribute to its long-range success in competition with other groups.75
A society displaying ritual efficiency will allocate social resources across rituals 
depending on the nature of the problem that the ritual addresses.  Other things equal, we 
can expect that the amount of resources that a society expends on a given ritual will be a 
function of the risk that the participant, now or in the future, will not conform his or her 
behavior to the prescribed social role.  This consideration suggests that a society is likely 
to expend more resources on rituals that impose relatively large changes in identity as 
compared with rituals that impose only minor changes.76  Similarly, a society is likely to 
expend more resources on rituals where the change in status is imposed on the individual 
as compared to rituals where the individual voluntarily assumes the social role.  If the role 
is imposed rather than voluntarily assumed, there is a greater risk that the inoculation will 
not “take,” and the participant will, sooner or later, start to behave in role-inconsistent 
ways.  Societies are also likely to expend greater resources on rituals when the roles to be 
assigned are seen as important,77 so that failure to display the behaviors demanded by the 
role will be costly.78  And societies are likely to expend greater resources on rituals that 
among the Wagenia of Zaire affected the behavior of initiates only marginally: the added the “final touches” 
rather than effecting major changes).
75 Some evidence for a tendency towards ritual efficiency can be gleaned from the fact that rituals 
sometimes disappear when they are not longer needed.  For example, curative rituals addressed to the 
smallpox goddess in Sri Lanka disappeared when Western medicine eradicated the disease.  See S.J. 
Tambiah, A Performative Approach to Ritual, 65 Proceedings of the British Academy 113, 129 (1979).
76 See Michio Kitahara, A Function of Marriage Ceremony, 16 Anthropologica 163, 165 
(1974)(“[t]he greater the difference between one’s attitudes before and after the transition, the more 
elaborate the rite of passage which one experiences.”)
77 See Bruce Lincoln, Emerging from the Chrysalis: Studies of Rituals of Women’s Initiation 91 
(1981)(conjecturing that “the presence of women’s initiation in a given culture is a mark of the importance 
of women within that culture and of the culture’s willingness to recognize this publicly and institutionally.”)
78 For example, a culture’s expenditure on female initiation rituals may be a positive function of the 
degree to which women are seen as essential to the material success of the culture or to the prestige enjoyed 
by men within the culture.  See Paul B. Roscoe, In the Shadow of the Tambaran: Female Initiation Among 
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establish relatively encompassing identities (gender, adulthood, marriage) than on rituals 
that establish more specific ones (graduation from school, assumption of office).  
E.  Celebration and Violence in the Ritual Process
In encouraging cooperation and discouraging defection, rituals utilize two 
principal “moods” or general qualities of emotional tone, one positive and the other 
negative.  I refer to these moods as “celebration” and “violence.”  Celebration and 
violence reflect contrasting poles of tension within the ritual process.  Together, they give 
ritual an ambiguous quality that contributes to its susceptibility to many meanings and 
interpretations.  These contrasting emotional moods reflect different aspects of the role of 
ritual in shaping personal identity to conform to social roles.79
The celebratory mood serves several purposes.  First, celebrations, because they 
are out of the ordinary and often marked by extreme behavior, are memorable 
experiences.  Ritual celebrations, accordingly, are likely to have a greater impact than are 
less emotionally charged events.  The celebratory element in ritual thus provides another 
means by which the ritual process can reach and mold the identity of a participant at a 
deep rather than a superficial level.
Second, celebration in ritual reflects and channels the emotions that accompany 
the occasion.  Usually, these are positive feelings – joy at the birth of a child, satisfaction 
of a bountiful harvest, happiness of lovers making a commitment.  Ritual embodies and 
expresses these positive feelings, thus reinforcing the linkage between personal identity 
the Ndu of the Sepic Basin, in Nancy C. Lutkehaus and Paul B. Roscoe, eds., Gender Rituals: Female 
Initiation in Melanesia 55-82, 81 (1995)(explaining elaboration of female initiation rites among Abelam 
group of Papua New Guinea as reflecting the degree to which men are thought to depend on women for 
success in the competition for prestige and political success).
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and social role and enhancing the perception that the ritual itself is a natural and 
legitimate part of social life.  Even if a participant is not particularly inclined to feel 
celebratory about the event, moreover, the requirement that he or she express a 
celebratory mood can induce good feelings not previously present – much as the act of 
smiling can itself make people feel happier.  
Third, celebration offers a reward to participants for conforming their personal 
identities with the social identity defined in the process.  Celebration is pleasurable.  In 
ritual celebrations, the participants express the feelings of security and joy that 
accompany acts of commitment to group solidarity.  Even if one celebrates an event, such 
as a marriage, one is also celebrating solidarity with others who share in the joy of a 
successful outcome.  What we celebrate is a commitment to a particular way of being, 
and the putting aside of other possible ways of being.
Many rituals are also marked by violence.80  As compared with celebration, which 
is usually explicit in ritual, violence assumes a number of different forms and may lurk 
beneath an ostensibly neutral or even positive appearance.  But it is usually possible to 
identify violent elements within a celebratory frame.  In some cases – principally but not 
exclusively in rituals of initiation – ritual violence takes the form of painful or disfiguring 
operations on the body of the participants.  Prominent among these is male and female 
79 Celebration and violence are not the only moods observed in rituals; funerals, for example, are 
characterized by sadness and mourning.
80 See generally Fiona Bowie, The Anthropology of Religion 151-189 (2000); Donald F. Tuzin, 
Ritual Violence Among the Ilahita Arapesh: The Dynamics of Moral and Religious Uncertainty, in Gilbert 
H. Herdt, ed., Rituals of Manhood: Male Initiation in Papua New Guinea 321-55 (1998); Maurice Bloch, 
From Blessing to Violence: History and Ideology of the Circumcision Ritual of the Merina of Madagascar
(1986)(discussing violent aspects of circumcision rituals in Madagascar); Maurice Bloch, Prey Into Hunter
(1992)(outline a more general theory of violence in ritual); Robert G. Hamerton-Kelly, Violent Origins: 
Walter Burkert, René Girard, and Jonathan Z. Smith on Ritual Killing and Cultural Formation (1987); 
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genital mutilation.  But genital mutilation is far from unique.  Scarification, piercing, and 
other anatomical interventions are observed.  Participants in rituals may also be subjected 
to assaults that do not result in anatomical changes.  Novices are beaten, whipped, 
scourged, bled, silenced, terrified, humiliated, deprived of food and drink, forbidden to 
wash, and forced to eat nauseating substances.81  Ritual violence may be displaced to 
another object, such an animal or a prop.82 Ritual violence can also be experienced as a 
form of play – mock battles, kidnappings, and verbal confrontations. Violence may also 
be threatened: ritual officials or supernatural beings may menace participants with 
terrifying consequences for misconduct. 
A theory of ritual as social control suggests several roles for ritual violence.83
First, the violence of ritual reflects, symbolizes, and in some respects directly implements 
the process of identity alteration.  Since violence is memorable, its infliction impresses an 
Walter Burkert, Homo Necans: The Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth (Peter 
Bing, tr. 1983).
81 See, e.g., André Droogers, The Dangerous Journey: Symbolic Aspects of Boys’ Initiation Among 
the Wagenia of Kisangani, Zaire 200-207 (1980)(describing the sufferings imposed on initiates in boys’ 
camps after circumcision).
82 Scapegoat rituals are an example.  See René Girard, Violence and the Sacred (1977). 
83 The theory of ritual violence as social control through identity manipulation differs from the 
leading theories in the literature.  René Girard argues that ritual violence manages impulses that would 
otherwise threaten to destroy social stability.  By displacing these impulses onto a safe victim that 
nevertheless displays similarity to the original object, the culture reinforces social bonds. Girard’s theory is 
explicitly functional: he observes that if violent impulses were not displaced through ritual, the bases for 
material prosperity within the culture would be threatened.  See René Girard, Violence and the Sacred
(1977). 
Maurice Bloch proposes a different approach to the violence in ritual. Bloch’s book on 
Madagascar argued that ritual violence takes the form of conquests in which social superiors attack and 
dominate inferiors and thereby reaffirm existing status hierarchies. Maurice Bloch, From Blessing to 
Violence: History and Ideology of the Circumcision Ritual of the Merina of Madagascar (1986).  His later 
theory argues that ritual violence is a mechanism through which participants can separate themselves from 
the immediate process of their lives, come to see themselves as permanent and transcending, and return to 
the ordinary enterprise of life in an energized and superior form.  Maurice Bloch, Prey Into Hunter (1992).  
Freud’s earlier work on the origins of religion and culture is also relevant.  Freud believed that 
many forms of ritual as well as non-ritual behavior – totemism, taboo, sacrifice, even religion as a whole –
was the product of an Oedipal conflict in which a horde of brothers rebelled against and killed their 
patriarchal father in order to gain access to females previously monopolized by the dominant male.  See 
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indelible memory on the subject.  Violence may be necessary, moreover, because the 
process of identity change may require the application of force.  People do not naturally 
grow into a social role.  They may be born with a genetic endowment, or may through 
early childhood experience develop a personal identity, that is at odds with the social role.  
Ritual excises these inconvenient aspects of the self in a process so profound as to “rattle 
the very gates of life and death.”84  Inflicting violence on the ritual subject may be 
necessary if the requisite identity change is to be assured.  
Second, ritual violence provides a mechanism for managing negative emotions 
that often accompany significant changes in social status.  Ritual offers a channel through 
which these feelings can be divested of their dangerous quality and “attached to 
components of the normative order. . . .”85  To manage such emotions, the ritual process 
needs to employ symbolism sufficient to represent the bad feelings and to contain them 
within the frame of an orderly social system.
Celebration and violence are not mutually exclusive: a ritual can display elements 
of both moods.  Nor are celebration and violence substitutes; it is not the case that a ritual 
displaying high levels of celebration must therefore employ low levels of violence.  Some 
rituals evince high levels of both celebration and violence, while others display modest 
levels of each.  However, it is often the case that one or the other of these moods will be 
the dominant theme.  For example, as discussed below, in weddings, the dominant theme 
is celebration, whereas in exorcisms, the dominant theme is violence. 
Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo: Resemblances Between the Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics
(1998)(first published 1913).
84 Gilbert Herdt, Guardians of the Flutes: Idioms of Masculinity 305 (1981).
85 Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure 52-53 (1991).
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Other things equal, we can expect that celebration will be an important motif in 
the case of rituals that reflect the participants’ voluntary choices.  When people willingly 
seek out a change in their social roles, or when they seek to reaffirm social roles that they 
have already assumed, they are likely to experience the role as consistent with their 
personal identities.  Because celebration in ritual expresses the sense of felicity that 
accompanies the identification of personal identity and social role, it is likely to find 
greatest expression when people voluntarily seek out the role.  But when the assignment 
of social roles is compulsory and not willingly sought out by individuals, we are likely to 
observe higher levels of violence and lower levels of celebration. This follows from the 
premise that rituals shape identity, and that the shaping of identity is, or can be, a violent 
act committed by the community against the individual going through the transformation.
Both violence and celebration are likely to be positively correlated with the 
magnitude of the identity change.  Violence is an important mood in rituals that effect 
large changes in identity because the larger the change in identity or the more pervasive 
the identity being prescribed, the greater is the likelihood of deviation between social role 
and the ritual subject’s natural propensities and inclinations.  Violence may be necessary 
to ensure that the transition succeeds when the social distance to be surmounted is large. 
Celebration is also likely to be an important mood when large changes in identity are 
being undertaken, since, if the process is successful, it results in a significant 
enhancement in the felicity that accompanies group solidarity.  On the other hand, rituals 
that effect only small changes in identity – or that merely reinforce identities already 
established – are unlikely to manifest high levels of either violence or celebration, 
although both moods are likely to be present to some extent.
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F.  Legitimacy
Since the ritual subject is required to mold his or her behavior to a social role, the 
question naturally presented is why the group has the right to impose such restrictions.  
Ritual, like other forms of social control, faces a need for justification.  To establish its 
legitimacy, it must demonstrate that the demands it makes on the individual are 
appropriate in terms of broader social benefits.
Rituals are legitimated, in part, through being performed. The performative aspect 
involves participants in the ritual and gives them a degree of responsibility for its success.  
In effect, performance of ritual places members of the group in the position of ratifying 
and endorsing its legitimacy.
 Ritual also establishes its legitimacy through the fact that it follows an apparently 
precise script, replicated each time the ritual occurs.86  The precision of ritual reminds 
participants that they are engaging in something that has been done since time out of 
mind.  Continuity assures participants that the demands of ritual do not represent ex post 
opportunism by any current member of society.87  Because the ritual has been performed 
without apparent change for so long, its demands appear desirable and good.  And, by 
indicating that rituals will continue in the future, knowledge of their long history 
reassures participants that they will not thereafter suffer expropriation at the hands of 
others.
86 This is not to say that rituals do not evolve or change over time.  They clearly do change, and the 
change reflects human agency.  See Margaret Thompson Drewal, Yoruba Ritual (1992)(emphasizing 
transformation of ritual by participants).  Nevertheless, rituals appear to display a relatively high degree of 
continuity over time.  Moreover, when change occurs, it is usually disguised.
87 This assurance, of course, may not be warranted, since political groups can and do attempt to alter 
the meaning of ritual performances in order to serve their immediate ends.  For an interesting case study, 
see Maurice Bloch, Maurice Bloch, From Blessing to Violence: History and Ideology of the Circumcision 
Ritual of the Merina of Madagascar (1986).
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Intellectual justification is also employed to justify rituals.  In many cases, a 
narrative or myth provides an account of the ritual’s origins.  Usually, such an etiology 
will contain elements that have legitimacy in the culture – for example, the protagonists 
may be revered ancestors or gods with authority in the culture.88  Rituals may also be 
justified through etymologies.  The symbols utilized by the ritual are explained by the 
sounds of the name assigned to them, which is associated and given meaning by being 
traced to some primary word or etymon.89  Usually, the etymology is fictitious, depending 
only on similarity of sounds.  But within the culture, the etymology becomes part of the 
explanation of the ritual.  The ritual elements receive validation by being associated with 
and explained by these linguistic roots.
As the society becomes more sophisticated, professional intellectuals may further 
rationalize the mythological, narrative or linguistic explanations by embedding them in 
systems of abstract thought.90  These formal systems enhance the legitimacy of the ritual 
because they illustrate its profundity and also convey the endorsement of a professionally 
qualified cohort who themselves claim prestige in the society.91
88 A point documented with respect to Vedic sacrificial rituals, in J.C. Hesterman, The Broken World 
of Sacrifice: An Essay in Ancient Indian Ritual (1993).  For an account of certain stories in the Book of 
Genesis as providing a justification for and regulation of the ancient Israelite sacrificial ritual, see Geoffrey 
P. Miller, Ritual and Regulation: A Legal-Economic Analysis of Selected Biblical Texts, 22 Journal of 
Legal Studies 477 (1993).
89 See Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure 11 (1969).
90 So, for example, the Christian ritual of the Eucharist is accounted for by an etiological origin story 
– the Last Supper as described in the Gospels.  But systematic theologians have ramified it into a highly 
sophisticated body of thought and analysis centered on the doctrines of Real Presence and 
Transubstantiation.
91 However, purely intellectual accounts will rarely be presented as a complete explanation of the 
ritual.  If the ritual could be fully explained in rational terms, then the rationale for its performance would 
be undermined.  Thus, theological explanations for ritual tend to emphasize the limits as well as the value of 
rationality: the ritual, ultimately, will be understood as carrying an element of mystery that cannot be 
explained on rational grounds alone.
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II.  Applications
Having set forth a concept of ritual as a form of social control, we are in a position 
to examine particular types of rituals within the theoretical framework.  
The function of rituals in shaping identity suggests the following typology.92
Rituals of reformation shape identity directly.  They attempt to “form” a person by 
aligning his or her personal identity with a social role that the person has not previously 
occupied.  Rituals of renewal reinforce the role-identity thus formed and thereby protect 
against regression to an old identity or evolution into a new one.  They can be thought of 
as “booster shots” designed to maintain the efficacy of the formative rituals.  Rituals of 
restoration come into play when the individual has fallen away to one degree or another 
from the social role prescribed by a ritual of reformation.  Restoration rituals are designed 
to cure the problem by bringing personal identity and social role back into alignment.
The distinction between rituals of reformation, renewal, and restoration is not
exclusive, in that many if not most rituals display more than one of these features.  For a 
novice, an initiation rite is principally one of reformation, since it is intended to shape 
identity and re-cast him or her as an adult.  But the novice may also, in the process, be 
required to confess and abjure former misdeeds – an act of restoration that places him or 
her in a proper status as a person in good social standing, qualified to undergo 
92 Anthropologists have attempted to categorize rituals in different ways.  Catherine Bell, for 
example, identifies six categories of ritual action: rites of passage, calendrical and commemorative rites, 
rites of exchange and communion, rites of affliction, rites of feasting, fasting and festivals, and political 
rituals.  Catherine Bell, Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions 94 (1997).  Ronald Grimes offers a 
categorization based on ritual “modes,” including ritualization, decorum, ceremony, liturgy, magic, and 
celebration.  Ronald Grimes, Beginnings in Ritual Studies (1982).  The categories discussed here are based 
on the function of ritual at controlling behavior; they are different from, but not necessarily inconsistent 
with these other systems. 
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transformation into a social adult.93  For an adult participant, meanwhile, the ceremony is 
likely to be partake of renewal: by participating, the adult is called on to recommit to a 
social role as well as to the overall structure of roles within which the ritual is 
performed.94 In part because many rituals include elements of reformation, renewal, and 
restoration, the various types of rituals identified by anthropologists tend to flow into one 
another: initiation is related to sacrifice,95 and sacrifice merges with trance.96  The 
classification of ritual into one of the three categories can be thought of as the 
identification of a dominant theme, rather than an exclusive function.  Even if initiation 
rituals have elements of renewal and restoration, their dominant theme is the formation of 
a new identity in the initiates, and therefore they are properly classified as rituals of 
reformation.
A.  Rituals of Reformation
1.  Initiation
Among the most important rituals of reformation are initiation ceremonies.  These 
take a child and mold him or her into an adult man or woman who – in theory at least –
expresses the culture’s ideals of proper behavior for persons enjoying adult status.97
93 See Corinne Kratz, Affecting Performance: Meaning, Movement, and Experience in Okiek 
Women’s Initiation (1994)(confession of social debts in Okiek girls’ initiation).
94 See Bruce Lincoln, Emerging from the Chrysalis: Studies of Rituals of Women’s Initiation 108 
(1981)(at rituals of female initiation, “those in attendance have their feelings of solidarity – the sentiment 
that holds society together – renewed by their participation in the rite . . .”)
95 See Maurice Bloch, Prey into Hunter 24 (1992)(identifying a “fundamental connection” between 
sacrifice and initiation).
96 See Luc de Heusch, Sacrifice in Africa: A Structuralist Approach (Linda O’Brien and Alice 
Morton, Tr., 1985)(viewing trance and sacrifice as part of a more general system).
97 This is not to say, obviously, that all initiation rituals serve this purpose alone, or that initiation 
rituals can easily be compared across cultures.  Ritual complexes within particular cultures will inevitably 
reflect differences in modes of subsistence, social ideals, gender relations, and history, among other factors.  
For a account emphasizing the differences in rituals of female initiation among two Sepik peoples of Papua 
New Guinea, see Brigitta Hauser-Schäublin, Puberty Rites, Women’s Naven, and Initiation: Women’s 
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Through the process of initiation, the neophyte is “created anew”98 – “reshaped or molded 
physically and psychologically so that society’s values can be inscribed on his or her body 
and mind.”99  Initiation rituals, in other words, shape the personal identity of the novice 
by conforming it to a social role.100
This function of initiation can be placed in the context of the problem of 
cooperation and defection already discussed.  In the prisoners dilemma game, as we have 
seen, the problem of cooperation can be overcome if both prisoners can make reliable 
commitments, ex ante, to cooperate rather than defect.  The problem could also be 
overcome, however, if instead of making credible promises to cooperate, the prisoners 
simply were people who cooperate – people whose identity is that of a cooperator. 
Imagine that each prisoner has a computer chip inserted into his brain that has the power 
to control his behavior, and that is irrevocably programmed to cause the prisoner to claim 
innocence regardless of the pressure the prosecutors might apply to induce a confession.  
Now the prisoners would cooperate, not because they agreed to do so, but because they 
had no choice in the matter.  Initiation rituals can be understood as functioning somewhat 
like this computer chip.  If effective, they program the novice to behave in ways 
demanded by the social role into which he or she is being initiated.  They create 
Rituals of Transition in Abelam and Iatmul Culture, in Nancy C. Lutkehaus and Paul B. Roscoe, eds., 
Gender Rituals: Female Initiation in Melanesia 33-54 (1995).
98 See Bruce Lincoln, Emerging from the Chrysalis: Studies of Rituals of Women’s Initiation 21 
(1981).
99 Fiona Bowie, The Anthropology of Religion 169 (2000).
100 The analysis suggested here is significantly different from the psychoanalytic approach to 
initiation, which has tended to emphasize the importance of male circumcision. Freud posited that 
circumcision represents a form of ritualized castration, through which enhances the bond of identification 
between father and son that originally formed during the Oedipal period.  Sigmund Freud, Totem and 
Taboo: Resemblances Between the Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics (1998)(first published 1913).  
Bruno Bettelheim, also writing in the analytic tradition, sees circumcision as expressing the boy’s envy of 
women and his wish to experience female conditions such as menstruation.  Bruno Bettelheim, Symbolic 
Wounds: Puberty Rites and the Envious Male (1971).
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cooperators.  They do this by causing the novice to experience his or her personal identity 
as congruent with the social role.101
The value of initiation rituals, understood within this framework, is likely to 
depend on whether society in question is insular or cosmopolitan.  In insular societies, it 
will often be the case that a person has no realistic choice about whether or not to deal 
with someone.  Kinship status, religious obligation, or practical necessity may necessitate 
dealings between people who might not otherwise wish to have anything to do with one 
another.  Even if someone does not have direct dealings with a compatriot, he or she will 
often deal indirectly with the person because of the tightly interconnected nature of 
insular societies.  In this situation, where people must rely on others not of their choosing, 
there is a high value to social institutions that ensure that everyone with whom one deals 
will satisfy at least some minimal standard for cooperative behavior.
A military patrol behind enemy lines provides an illustration.  This small society 
displays two features that characterize insular societies.  First, the soldiers are mutually 
reliant: every member entrusts his or her life to every other.  The person on watch must 
not fall asleep, and the person in charge of the ammunition must not forget to bring it 
along.  Second, the soldiers have no choice about their comrades, who are simply 
assigned to work together.  In these conditions of mutual reliance and lack of partner 
choice, all members of the patrol can benefit if everyone has undergone initiation rituals 
(hazing and boot camp) that mold them into reliable soldiers.
101 Obviously, initiation rituals are not always successful at molding identities; even in societies 
characterized by elaborate and painful rituals, some initiates end up behaving in ways labeled deviant by 
their culture.  However, the process need not be perfect for it to be beneficial.  If initiation is even 
somewhat effective at aligning personal identity with social role, the effect can be to enhance the trust levels 
in the society.
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When we move to cosmopolitan societies, there is still an obvious benefit to 
initiation rituals that cause people to identify with social roles commanding cooperative 
behavior.  The benefit, however, is less significant than in the case of insular societies.  
The reason is that in a cosmopolitan society, people have a choice about the others with 
whom they interact.  People can seek out persons they know to be trustworthy and 
reliable, and avoid persons they know to be unreliable.  The ability to select one’s 
partners provides a significant protection in cosmopolitan societies.  Moreover, the same 
power of choice provides a powerful incentive for voluntary cooperation.  If I get a 
reputation as an unreliable person, people will not seek me out with beneficial offers of 
business or social interaction.  I will be poorer and less happy. I have an incentive to act 
in a cooperative way in order to develop a reputation as someone with whom others can 
safely deal.  Because a cosmopolitan culture provides built-in incentives to cooperate, it 
less essential that individuals be socialized into cooperators through the medium of rituals 
of initiation.
Other considerations complicate this analysis, however.  While cosmopolitan 
societies offer opportunities for choice in partner selection that are far greater than the 
available options in insular societies, they suffer from a disadvantage when it comes to 
actually exercising that choice.  In insular societies, people usually have good information 
about their compatriots.  If they had a choice of partners, in other words, they could 
choose well; the problem is that they lack partner choice.  In cosmopolitan societies, in 
contrast, people have much greater partner choice, but also have less reliable information 
about potential partners.  Compared to residents of insular societies, residents of 
cosmopolitan societies have more partners to choose from but may not choose as well.  
37
This information problem lowers the advantages that citizens of cosmopolitan societies 
enjoy, and provides a reason to maintain rituals of initiation in such societies.  It is 
doubtful, however, that the advantage is sufficient to make initiation rituals as valuable 
for cosmopolitan societies as they are for insular ones.  Cosmopolitan societies have 
developed various mechanisms other than ritual for overcoming information problems.  
These include informal social mechanisms (reputation), private market mechanisms 
(markers of reliability such as completion of a demanding graduate program), and legal 
doctrines (contract-at-will, protections for statements of opinion, rights of association). 
Eric Posner’s work suggests still another reason why one might observe initiation 
rituals in cosmopolitan society, notwithstanding the extensive partner choice that such a 
culture offers to its members.102  Quite apart from whether they are actually efficacious at 
shaping identities, initiation rituals may work as a signal of otherwise unobservable 
qualities.  People who have undergone initiation, for example, may be perceived as more 
reliable than people who have not undergone the ritual.  Thus, rituals can offer a 
technique for overcoming the information problem that makes partner choice unreliable 
in cosmopolitan societies.  In this respect, the severity of the ritual may add credibility by 
screening out false signals.  If the ritual is painful or costly, it will send a more reliable 
signal than if it is pleasurable or cheap.103  However, notwithstanding the potential value 
of rituals as carriers of information, it appears unlikely that they will often be cost-
effective signals in a cosmopolitan society, given the probable availability of other signals
which may be less costly or more reliable.
102 See Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms (2000).
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The upshot of this rather complex analysis is that in insular societies, initiation 
rituals can offer potentially significant value as a means of overcoming the prisoners 
dilemma problem by shaping people into cooperators.  In cosmopolitan societies, such 
rituals have value because they generate cooperators and because they provide a means 
for signaling cooperative traits.  However, because people enjoy a high degree of partner-
choice in cosmopolitan societies, these benefits are lower than the comparable benefits of 
initiation rituals in insular societies.  The analysis suggests that initiation rituals are likely 
to be more important in insular societies than in cosmopolitan ones – a conjecture that 
appears to be borne out by observation.
The idea of ritual efficiency suggests that initiation ceremonies will often involve 
large social expenditures in the insular societies where they have their greatest utility.  
The transition in identity that the initiate undergoes in such ceremonies is large.  Initiation 
rituals can turn “gentle boys” into “warriors capable of killing rage, stealthy murder, and 
bravery.”104  Further, initiation ceremonies are usually imposed rather than being 
voluntarily elected.  Novices aren’t given much of a choice whether to undergo the 
process; their alternatives are to be excluded or reviled.  And the social roles governed by 
initiation tend to be encompassing.  Initiations turn children into adults, boys and girls 
into men and women.  It is not surprising, therefore, that many initiation ceremonies 
employ a wide range of costly techniques and strategies for identity alteration.
103 This was a reason Maimonides gave for the rite of circumcision: because circumcision was a “hard 
thing,” it was, he said, a reliable method for distinguishing between Gentile and Jew.  See 3 Moses 
Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed 610 (Shlomo Pines, tr. 1963). 
104 Roger M. Keesing, Introduction, in Gilbert H. Herdt, ed., Rituals of Manhood: Male Initiation in 
Papua New Guinea 1, 3 (1998).
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Initiation rituals tend to display relatively high levels of both celebration and 
violence. The violence in initiation rituals reflects the function that is being performed: 
the novice is subjected to a form of psychic surgery in which his or her identity is molded 
into a new social role.105  The violence inflicted on the body of the novice both effects a 
transformation of identity, and symbolizes the transformation that has been 
accomplished.106  The celebration in initiation appears to reflect the culture’s perception –
or perhaps more accurately, its assertion – that the novice has successfully passed over the 
threshold into adulthood.  To complete the ritual, the novice must shed his or her childish 
identity and come to self-identify as an adult man or woman as those roles are defined 
within the culture.  The celebration of ritual reflects the perception of congruence 
between personal identity and social role.  In general, we may predict that in rituals of 
initiation, the element of violence will tend to be more in evidence early in the process, 
when the novice is undergoing the transformation into an adult.  The element of 
celebration will tend to emerge as the dominant motif late in the process, when the novice 
has successfully completed his or her trials and been certified as an adult. 
2.  Marriage
105 Even celebratory and peaceful forms of initiation, such as baptism, can be understood as 
containing a subtle subtext of violence: while usually conceptualized as a washing away of sin, baptism is 
also, in some sense, a symbolic drowning.  
106 For example, the scars inscribed on a women’s body during initiation ceremonies among the Tiv of 
Nigeria “are simultaneously the means of her transformation and the visible mark that this transformation 
has been completed, making each girl a woman . . .” Bruce Lincoln, Emerging from the Chrysalis: Studies 
of Rituals of Women’s Initiation 49 (1981).
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Marriages are nearly universal features of human societies. They are rituals of 
reformation because, if successful, they facilitate a change in social status: the bride and 
groom cease being “single” and assume the role of  “married.”107
The theory presented above suggests that if cultures are willing to devote 
substantial resources to the marriage ritual, it must be because, at least in part, the ritual 
discourages people from acting in socially undesirable ways or encourages them to act in 
socially desirable ones.  The value of the social role appears to be the following.  
Marriage is the principal ritual that holds human beings together in a pair bond that 
facilitates and enhances paternal investment in children, as well as the transmission of 
wealth across generations.  Left to their own devices and wishes, men and women may 
display promiscuous sexual behavior, and their investment and involvement with their 
children may be weaker than society would prefer.  Marriage creates a socially sanctioned 
space in which society approves and encourages sexual intercourse, childbearing, and
commitment of resources for rearing and educating children.108  The obligations of 
fidelity and permanence that are sealed through wedding ceremonies evidence the fact 
that one important purpose of marriage is to hold the parents in the union and place them
in the position of guardian and protector of children.
Certain features of marriage rituals can be understood as facilitating the process of 
assigning a new social role to the couple and encouraging them to align their personal 
identities with the role so assigned.  For example, in general, the couple can be expected 
107 Depending on the society, this may include a change in attitude towards sexual behavior, which 
may be strongly disapproved before marriage and required afterwards.  See Michio Kitahara, A Function of 
Marriage Ceremony, 16 Anthropologica 163 (1974).  Marriage rituals have other functions, of course; 
among others, they facilitate the forging of bonds between social groups.
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to desire the union.  They experience the felicity that accompanies the successful 
alignment of personal identity and social role.  Weddings offer ample opportunities for 
the couple to express these emotions in the company of their family and friends.  The 
celebratory mood in marriage reinforces the alignment between personal identity and 
social role as well as the legitimacy of the ritual itself.
Marriage rituals recognize that felicity does not always last.  Marriage is a long-
term proposition, and there is always the possibility that one or both of the spouses will 
become dissatisfied.  However sacred the marriage vows, they are often broken, 
threatening the social value of the institution.  Within marriage ceremonies, we may 
discern the presence of elements of coercion that appear to respond to this risk. These 
may help explain the odd subtext of violence that lurks beneath the mood of celebration 
in marriages.
At many Christian weddings, the guests throw rice at the bride and groom.  This 
practice can be the occasion for hilarity.  But what does the rice throwing symbolize?  
The assembled members of the community are pelting the newlyweds with small, hard 
objects.  This is not friendly, but hostile. The act of simultaneous group throwing “is an 
aggressive gesture, like beginning a fight, even if the most harmless projectiles are 
chosen.”109  Why would the assembled guests pelt the couple?  Because the community is 
acting out, in an ostensibly light-hearted but in fact serious drama, the traditional penalty 
for violating the marriage vows.  Symbolically, the throwing of the rice represents a ritual 
108 See Elisabeth Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 Virginia Law Review 
1901 (2000)(describing the social control function of the social norms that are commonly associated with 
marriage).
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stoning of the couple – the prescribed biblical penalty for adultery. The message of the 
rice throwing is that the bride and groom will be closely watched by the community, 
supported if they follow the rules, but penalized if they fall away.  This message is 
reinforced by other elements of covert violence in the ritual, such as the anonymous 
defilement of the bride and groom through soaping the wedding vehicle or tying tin cans 
behind.
The traditional Jewish marriage ceremony contains similar elements.  The groom 
is called to the Torah the Shabbat before the wedding, and congregation showers him 
with candy, raisins and nuts.  This pelting of the groom is said to be symbolic of the 
congregation’s wishes that the couple enjoy a sweet and fruitful marriage.  Again, 
however, the mass throwing of small, hard objects at the groom may be understood as 
more than a friendly act.  As in the Christian ceremony, this act has elements of a ritual 
stoning designed to warn the groom of the risks he faces if he breaks his vows and 
commits adultery.  Other elements of the Jewish wedding ceremony partake of violence 
as well.  The officiating Rabbi breaks a plate after the bride and groom sign the marriage 
contract.  This appears on the surface to be an odd gesture bespeaking separation and 
violence – particularly odd because it occurs immediately after the couple have 
committed themselves to a life together.  It seems that the breaking of the plate warns the 
couple of the consequences they can expect if they break the covenant.  The exhilarating 
ride in a chair traditionally given to the bride and groom during the post-wedding
celebration may convey a similar message: the couple are sustained by the community, 
109 Walter Burkert, Homo Necans: The Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth 5 
(1983).  Burkert’s observations are in the context of an analysis of Greek sacrificial rituals, but their 
relevance to the throwing of rice at a wedding is obvious.
43
but also threatened with a frightening sanction in the event that the support is 
withdrawn.110
Marriage affects the interests many people.  The change in status effected by the 
ceremony is profound, implicating basic features of social organization such as kinship or 
the allocation of wealth.  Not surprisingly, therefore, marriage rituals are directed in part 
at participants other than the bride and groom.  Most participants desire the status change, 
and therefore share in the celebration wholeheartedly.  But others may have mixed or 
negative feelings.  Family members may resent “losing” a sibling or child; competing 
claimants on family wealth may dislike the assets being given to the couple; and rejected 
suitors may nurse anger and disappointment.  
Marriage rituals offer channels for managing these potentially dangerous feelings.  
Consider the practice of “giving away” the bride.  The bride’s parents may feel angry and 
upset about losing a daughter, but whatever their feelings, they must publicly relinquish 
their continuing claims on her.  Or consider the ceremony of cutting the cake.  The 
resentment of competing claimants on family wealth is addressed, to some extent, by this 
ritual element, which symbolically divides desirable assets among the participants.111
Those who partake of the cake symbolically express their acceptance of the proposition 
that the allocation of wealth incident to the marriage is fair and good.
110 Another feature is the tradition that the groom breaks a glass at the conclusion of the ceremony.  
This may convey a further warning about the sanctity of the marriage covenant and the risks of breaking it.
Traditional interpretations for the breaking of the glass are that it symbolizes the breaking of the bride’s 
hymen, or that it wards off evil spirits.  See Alan Unterman, Judiasm, in Jean Holm, ed., Rites of Passage
113-133 (1994).  Another tradition holds that the action is a gesture of remembrance for the destruction of 
the Temple in Jerusalem.
111 In this respect, the cutting of the cake resembles rituals of sacrifice discussed below, which appear 
to symbolize the fairness of the society’s rules for distributive justice.  See notes xx-xx and accompanying 
text, infra.
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Marriage rituals can also be understood as incorporating elements designed to 
manage the feelings of disappointed suitors. The European charivari or the American 
shivaree consist of mock musical assaults committed against the bride and groom on the 
wedding night, committed by drunken young men of the community.112  These 
institutions permit disappointed suitors to express hostility towards the couple, but also 
require them to commit themselves to respect the marriage rights thereafter.  The 
ceremony of throwing the bride’s garter to unattached males, while not itself a violent 
ritual element, appears designed to channel potentially angry emotions that the bride’s 
removal from the marriage market might evoke.  The garter symbolically transfers the 
bride’s sexual availability, thus reassuring disappointed suitors that other women will be 
available to fill the role now foreclosed to the bride.  The groom’s throwing of the 
corsage may serve a similar role for disappointed women.  
In cultures with extended kinship ties, a marriage often pits family groups against 
one another over matters such as wealth transfers or where the marrying couple will live.  
The resentments associated with these issues threaten the peace and stability of the 
culture.  Some marriage rituals channel these emotions by controlled displays of violence. 
Sometimes the bride is taken with a rite of capture in which she is expected to struggle 
against her abduction by the groom and his companions.  In other cultures, it may be the 
poorer party – bride or groom – who is kidnapped by the richer party’s family.113  More 
generalized battles between competing groups may also occur.114  When these hostilities 
112 See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Fourth Ed. 2000).
113 See Christopher Lamb, Buddhism, in Jean Holm, ed., Rites of Passage 10, 29 (1994)(describing 
kidnapping practices incident to marriage among Tibetan Buddhists).
114 Van Gennep, writing in 1908, describes a marriage ritual among the Khond of southern India.  
When a marriage had been agreed to by the respective families, the girl would be delivered in the company 
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are allowed expression within the framework of the ritual, they can be controlled so that 
they do not break out into behaviors more threatening to social welfare.
3. Installation
Rituals of installation are ceremonies that mark the transition of an individual into 
an office of authority within a society.115  Classic installation rituals are coronations and 
inaugurations.116  Because rituals of installation involve assumption of office, political 
authorities often manage these events.  But rituals of installation can involve offices that 
are not political in the narrow sense; they may celebrate the elevation of a minister to a 
pulpit, or a law professor to a deanship.
In terms of the legal function of ritual, the key factor informing the structure of 
these rituals is the nature of office.117  By establishing offices and endowing them with 
authority, societies economize on the costs of group decision-making, and facilitate the 
application of force to individuals whose behavior fails to comply with group norms.  
Institutions of office, in short, are necessary to manage the basic social compact of 
cooperation and to effectively police against defection.  The creation of office, and the 
installation of a particular individual in the office so created, however, creates costs of 
their own.  First, there is the danger that rival candidates or their supporters will refuse to 
of other young women of her village to the groom, who would stand in the road accompanied by other 
young men of his village armed with sticks.  “The women attack the young men, hitting with them sticks, 
stones, and clods of earth, and the boys defend themselves with their sticks.”  In another group, the bride’s 
brothers engage her betrothed in a mock battle, first wounding him in the leg, and finally hitting him on the 
head with a club.  Arnold van Gennep, The Rites of Passage 128 (1960).
115 Also included in this category are the (comparatively rare) rituals of de-installation, such as the 
defrocking of a priest.
116 For an anthropologist’s account, see Meyer Fortes, Ritual and Office, in in Max Gluckman, ed., 
Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations 53-88 (1962)
117 I use the idea of “office” in an everyday sense, as meaning a social role that carries with it 
obligations and responsibilities, and that is generally recognized as conferring certain authority over others.  
The concept has been an important concern of sociology at least since Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic 
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accept the elevation of the victor, leading to political instability.118  Second, there is the 
danger that others will not respect the authority of the office or its occupant, especially if 
incited to insubordination by the disappointed candidate’s party.  Finally, there is the 
danger that the person elevated to the office will use the powers so conferred to serve his 
or her own self-interest rather than that of the broader society.  A basic problem of 
governmental design is to minimize the sum of the cost of private defection from 
cooperative norms and abuse of trust by persons holding public office.119  Rituals of 
installation are one means by which a society responds to this problem.
Installation in office transforms identity.  The person is no longer simply an 
individual, but also the holder of an office.  If successful, the installation ritual can have a 
dramatic effect.  A person is perceived as “growing” into the position, and thereby 
becoming somehow different than he or she had previously been.  As Meyer Fortes 
describes a Tallensi man who had been installed into a tribal office, “[a]lmost overnight, 
an ineffectual old man was turned into a dignified, self-confident, and authoritative, if 
somewhat garrulous, leader.”120   The legal function of a ritual of installation is to 
mediate and facilitate this transformation of identity.  It can therefore be classified 
together with rituals of initiation and marriage as a ritual of reformation.
and the Spirit of Capitalism (1930), but the development of the idea within the field of sociology is not the 
concern of this paper.
118 See Max Gluckman, Les Rites de Passage, in Max Gluckman, ed., Essays on the Ritual of Social 
Relations 44-45 (1962)(addressing how rituals of installation can alleviate the rancor felt by the 
disappointed candidate or his supporters).
119 This is the fundamental project of a republican form of government, and a principal objective of 
the Framers of the United States Constitution.  For discussion, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Rights and Structure 
in Constitutional Theory, 8 Social Philosophy & Policy 196 (1991).
120 Meyer Fortes, Ritual and Office in Tribal Society, in Max Gluckman, ed., Essays on the Ritual of 
Social Relations 68 (1962).
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The identity being transformed by a ritual of installation is not ordinarily as
encompassing as some other identities, such as adulthood, gender, or marital status.  
Thus, rituals of installation are unlikely to call forth the same level of expenditure as 
rituals marking transformation to these more fundamental identities.  On the other hand, 
if the office is particularly important, it will affect the lives of many more people in the 
society than the transformation of an individual’s personal status.  Thus we can expect –
quite obviously – a higher level of social expenditure on rituals that mark the installation 
in office of higher-level officials than lower-level ones.
Because the party assuming office nearly always consents to the position – indeed, 
usually, ardently desires it – rituals of installation are primarily celebratory in spirit.  
However, rituals of installation are likely to have a subtext of violence as well, reflecting 
and managing the dangers associated with the creation of office.  This violence may be 
expressed directly in the form of symbolic gestures121 or ritualized abuse.122  Or the 
violence may be manifested in the form of stringent taboos or other controls that the ritual 
imposes on the official.123  Ritual violence may also be directed against people who might 
refuse to accept the legitimacy of the office or of the person being installed into it.  The 
ritual constitutes a public recognition of the legitimacy of the office and its holder.  Thus, 
installation rituals, particularly in the political sphere, may be accompanied by 
121 When English subjects are knighted, for example, the monarch touches them on the shoulder with 
a sword.  This appears to be a symbolic beheading representing the consequences that the office holder can 
expect if he fails to live up to the behaviors expected of a person in his position.
122 As in certain African status elevation ceremonies, in which the office holder is rudely abased and 
reprimanded by the community before being installed in his stool.  See Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: 
Structure and Anti-Structure 170-72 (1969).
123 See Meyer Fortes, Ritual and Office, in Max Gluckman, ed., Essays on the Ritual of Social 
Relations 53-88 (1962)
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conspicuous displays of military power, conveying the threat of severe sanctions against 
anyone who dares contest the office-holder’s authority.
B.  Rituals of Renewal
There is always a risk that the social identity prescribed by the ritual will not 
“take” – that over time, the individual will commence, or revert to, behaviors that are 
inconsistent with the social role as prescribed by the ritual.  People need continuing 
inoculations in order to maintain the close linkage between their personal identities and 
social roles.  Rituals to perform such inoculations can be termed as rituals of renewal.124
They do not assign a new social role, but rather dramatize an existing status relationship 
and thus serve to reinforce it.125
1. Services
The many rituals that punctuate ordinary life can be seen as serving the function 
of continuing alignment of identity and role.  A Christian goes to church and takes 
communion.  The ritual of the church service serves to remind the person of his or her 
role – say, as a believing Christian who has been confirmed in the faith. Through repeated 
performance of the ritual, the individual is reminded of his or her social role and reaffirms 
a commitment to it.  
Ordinary services tend to be embedded in larger cycles temporally marked by 
certain rituals conceived of as more important.  Christian church services, for example, 
may be structured with reference to where the service stands relative to important 
occasions such as Christmas, Easter, Good Friday, or Epiphany.  Jewish services are 
124 They might also be referred to as rituals of intensification, because they intensify the individual’s 
commitment to the social identity defined by ritual.   See Douglas Davies, Christianity, in in Jean Holm, ed., 
Rites of Passage 41, 47 (1994).
49
structured with reference to the major holidays, and also by means of the progressive 
reading of Torah and Haftorah sections throughout the year.  Muslim services are also 
organized around major holidays.  Through this means, the routine performance of 
religious observations is tied to larger structures of meaning that offer a comprehensive 
system within which an individual may conceive of his or her identity. 
2.  Patriotic Rituals
A different form of renewal is expressed in patriotic rituals.  The social role coded 
by these rituals is that of a citizen.  The purpose of the ritual is to help align the 
individual’s sense of identity with the social role of being a citizen of a nation or other 
political group.  If the ritual is effective, the participant will conceive of himself or herself 
as an “American” (or whatever other country or political entity claims that person’s 
allegiance).  Patriotic rituals can be classed as rituals of renewal because participants do 
not, by virtue of participating in them, change their identities, but rather renew and 
recommit themselves to an identity already in place.
Patriotism can be useful to the overall society, in large measure because the 
identity of a patriot implies a willingness to sacrifice one’s own interests – indeed, one’s 
own life – for the good of the country in times of crisis.  When it comes to the demands 
of patriotism, individuals have a strong interest to defect from cooperative arrangements 
demanded of civilians during times of military exigency.  People may want to avoid going 
to war, or, if in the service, to avoid getting in harm’s way.  Others who do not serve may 
also have an incentive to defect.126   Thus, we observe rituals designed to maintain 
125 See F.W. Young, Initiation Ceremonies: A Cross-Cultural Study of Status Dramatization (1965).
126 For example, during the Second World War American civilians were asked to comply with 
rationing programs, adhere to price controls, and purchase war bonds.
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“patriotic sprit” – i.e., people’s sense of identity as a member of the political group.  
Other things equal, we can expect societies to invest greater resources in patriotic rituals 
as perceived external threats to national interests become more salient.127
Patriotic rituals tend to display symbolic violence.128  Military and quasi-military 
parades, martial music, overflights of jets, and the explosions of fireworks are common 
features.  Patriotic rituals also focus, frequently, on martyrs of the nation – war heroes, 
unknown soldiers, and others who have made the “ultimate sacrifice.”  Even the 
celebration of patriotic rituals tends to have certain violent tenor, as in the case of the 
“oohs” and “aahs” of awed witnesses to fireworks bursts, or the regimented precision of a 
marching band.  The violence of these rituals symbolizes the demands that the country is 
prepared to make of its citizens in a time of national peril – and the readiness with which 
the citizen is expected to respond to the call for help.
3.  Sacrifice
Any society, even the most primitive, must address the problem of distributive 
justice.  At its most abstract level, the problem takes the form of the prisoners dilemma 
already discussed.  Significant economies can be realized if people join together in 
productive activities rather than act individually.  But when people join together to 
produce commodities, they face the problem of how to allocate the fruits of their labor.  
Ex post, it is in everyone’s individual interest to seek to appropriate as large a share of the 
social product as possible.  But if one person takes a great deal for himself, it will leave 
127 These rituals, of course, are subject to manipulation by political leaders eager to manufacture 
citizens who are willing to sacrifice their personal interests for the leaders’ agendas.  Consider the Nazi 
Party’s heavy use of patriotic rituals designed to stimulate loyalty to the Fatherland.
128 For an analysis of the connection between violence and patriotism, see Carolyn Marvin and David 
W. Ingle, Blood Sacrifice and the Nation: Totem Rituals and the American Flag (1999).
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less for others.  If people do not believe that they will receive a fair share at the end of the 
day – at a minimum, as much as they would be able to obtain for themselves by working 
alone – they will not want to join in the productive process in the first place.  
Opportunistic expropriation of the social product by individuals threatens the implicit 
contract of cooperation that gives people an incentive to join in the society in the first 
place.  Ex ante, therefore, it is in everyone’s interest to make a credible commitment to 
share the surplus in an equitable way and to refrain from seeking to expropriate 
everything for oneself.  Defining the equitable sharing rule is the core problem of 
distributive justice.129
A classic example of the problem of distributive justice in primitive cultures 
occurs in the institution of the hunt.  A group of hunters cooperates to kill an animal.   
Now they face the problem of how to divide it.  The division of the slain animal 
encompasses in symbolic form the entire problem of distributive justice, because it 
involves the issue of how the fruits of cooperative activities should be allocated among 
the members of the society.  All hunters have an interest in cooperating to kill the animal, 
since no one hunter can accomplish the task alone.  Once the animal is dead, however, 
their interests diverge.  Each hunter has an incentive to take as much of the carcass as he 
can.  Squabbling or violence about sharing, however, may not only be hurtful in itself, but 
may also reduce the incentive people have to cooperate in hunting in the first place.   
Society is better off if the spoils are distributed according to some sharing rule deemed 
reasonably just by the members.
129 See generally John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971).  For an interpretation of Locke’s theory of 
property as expressing similar concerns about distributive justice in the allocation of the productive surplus, 
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Sacrificial rituals, observed in many parts of the world and exceedingly ancient in 
origin,130 are concerned in part with problems of distributive justice.131   They appear to 
derive from the hunt, and can be interpreted as referring symbolically to the problem of 
distributing the carcass of the killed animal.132  Typically, the person making the sacrifice 
shares the food with others according to precise rules of allocation.133  If the society 
supports a class of ritual officials to oversee the sacrifice, the priests will perform the 
killing and divide up the parts, taking a portion for themselves in exchange for their 
services.  The basic trade-off is this: the participant promises not to monopolize the 
available social resources and agrees to a regime for fair allocation among the group.  In 
exchange, the individual gets assurances of protection for his share as well as some 
degree of support should he be unable to provide for himself.134
see Geoffrey P. Miller, Economic Efficiency and the Lockean Proviso, 10 Harvard Journal of Law and 
Public Policy 401 (1987).
130 See Walter Burkert, Homo Necans: The Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and 
Myth 9 (1983)(animal sacrifice was “an all-pervasive reality in the ancient world.”)
131 This is not to say that distributive justice is the only function of sacrifice.  Like many complex 
social institutions, sacrifice serves multiple functions and has many meanings across cultures.  See generally 
Luc de Heusch, Sacrifice in Africa: A Structuralist Approach (Linda O’Brien and Alice Morton, Tr., 
1985)(emphasizing wide variety in sacrifices as reported in the scholarly literature). 
Nor is this to say that sacrifice is the only form of ritual concerned with distributive justice. See, 
e.g., Max Gluckman, Les Rites de Passage, in Max Gluckman, ed., Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations
39 (1962)(many rituals address the “fundamental conflict that arises out of the common interest which 
society has in the fertility of fields and flocks and women, while it precisely over fields and flocks and 
women that individuals come into competition and dispute.”)
132 Walter Burkert focuses on the importance of the hunt in the ritual of sacrifice.  See Walter Burkert, 
Creation of the Sacred: Tracks of Biology in Early Religions (1996); Walter Burkert, Homo Necans: The 
Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth (1983).  Burkert, however, does not associate 
the institution of the hunt with the problem of distributive justice.  He argues, instead, that food is offered to 
others as expiation for the acting of killing the sacrificial victim. 
133 See, e.g., John G. Galaty, Ceremony and Society: The Poetics of Maasai Ritual, 18 Man 361-82, 
375 (1983)(Maasai ritual of ox sacrifice); Walter Burkert, Homo Necans: The Anthropology of Ancient 
Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth 37-38 (1983)(the sacrificial meal is “particularly subject to sacred laws 
that regulation social interaction in distributing, giving, and taking.”)
134 The notion that rituals of sacrifice are means for coping with the problem of distributive justice is 
different from anthropological accounts.  Early scholars such as Robertson Smith, Henri Hubert, and Marcel 
Mauss recognized that sacrifice served a social function, but conceptualized it as a relationship between the 
celebrant and the deity.  The function of sacrifice was to establish a channel for safe interaction between 
humans and gods, and an avenue for a gift exchange in which the celebrant offers food to the god as 
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Like other rituals, sacrifice conforms personal identity to social role.  In the case 
of sacrifice, the social role is that of citizenship – being a member of a polity135
characterized by a principle of distributive justice that is accepted as fair by all.136  That 
sense of solidarity with the group is sealed by the act of eating and drinking together, the 
classic symbol of social union.137  If sacrifice is effective, the participant will refrain from 
taking more than the share of the social surplus that is allocated to him by the society’s 
principle of distributive justice.  Moreover, because sacrifice is usually a public act, the 
participant can demonstrate to others that he is a good citizen who can be relied on to 
behave appropriately when it comes to the allocation of the surplus.  People thereby can 
have greater assurance that they will not be taken advantage of by others when they 
follow the social rules on resource allocation.
Sacrificial rites display features of all three types of ritual discussed in this paper –
reformation, renewal, and restoration.  For example, a sacrifice may be performed at the 
conclusion of an initiation (reformation) or as part of a ceremony of cure (restoration).  
The most fundamental meaning of sacrificial rituals, however, appears to be that of 
propitiation or as an exchange for favors.  See William Robertson Smith, Lectures on the Religion of the 
Semites: The Fundamental Institutions (1969)(viewing sacrifice as a means by which devotees, by eating 
the flesh of a totem animal, became assimilated with it and with one another); Henri Hubert and M. Mauss, 
Sacrifice: Its Nature and Function (W.D. Halls, tr. 1964)(viewing sacrifice as a means by which people 
communicate with divine forces through mediation through the sacrificial victim).  René Girard, in contrast, 
views animal sacrifice as a response to the pervasiveness of violence in human society.  The terror of 
uncontrolled killing in human societies is channeled into the controlled world of sacrifice, though a process 
of scapegoating in which the animal becomes the socially safe repository for aggressive impulses. René 
Girard, Violence and the Sacred (1977).
135 By “polity,” I mean only some relatively organized social group; the term would include clans and 
tribes as well as nation-states.
136 Thus, in the ancient world, communities at all levels of organization constituted themselves 
through sacrifice: families, guilds, cities, and even larger social groups.  See Walter Burkert, Homo Necans: 
The Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth 35-36 (1983).
137 See Arnold Van Gennep, The Rights of Passage 29 (1960); William Robertson Smith, Lectures on 
the Religion of the Semites: The Fundamental Institutions (1969); Walter Burkert, Creation of the Sacred:
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renewal.  The individual who participates in them is typically reaffirming solidarity with 
the group rather than establishing it for the first time.138  The renunciation inherent in 
sacrifice symbolizes the fact that, in affirming the society’s principle of distributive 
justice, its members must resist the temptation to take more than their share of the social 
surplus.  The sacrificial ritual is essentially a commitment to a constitution and to 
nationhood.139
In representing the basic rules for allocating the social surpluses, the institution of 
sacrifice depends on the claim that the allocation is fair.  For developed cults, this often 
means that the allocation function is placed in the hands of some person endowed with 
authority of office.  To ensure the fairness of the allocation, such individuals should not 
be identified or aligned with any particular clan, party, or interest.  Thus, such individuals 
tend to be set apart from the ordinary play of interests that characterizes the competition 
for resources in social groups.140  The impartiality required of these officials can be 
Tracks of Biology in Early Religions 150 (1996)(sharing of food is a “basic form of collaboration among 
humans”).
138 Durkheim conceived of this function as a sort of recharging of a battery.  In discussing sacrifice 
among Australian tribes, he observes that “all forces, even the most spiritual, are worn away with the 
passage of time if nothing replenishes the energy they lose in the ordinary course of events . . . The people 
of a totem cannot remain themselves unless they periodically renew the totemic principle that is in them . . 
.”  Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life 342 (Karen E. Fields, Tr. 1995).
139 For an argument that even the United States, a society without formal national rituals of sacrifice, 
maintains a symbolic sacrificial system establishing our identity as a nation, see Carolyn Marvin and David 
W. Ingle, Blood Sacrifice and the Nation: Totem Rituals and the American Flag 1 (1999)(arguing that 
violent blood sacrifice is what makes enduring groups cohere, and that the U.S. political system is 
organized around a sacrificial system in which the flag functions as a “bloodthirsty totem god who 
organizes killing energy.”)  Marvin and Ingle display considerable insight into the role of sacrifice in 
defining nationhood and in recognizing that apparently “primitive” rituals can often be discerned, in 
disguised form, within contemporary society.  But they fail to offer a convincing explanation for why the 
institution of sacrifice should be efficacious to achieve this purpose, contenting themselves with the 
mystical-sounding idea that the “totem god of society” must “eat its worshippers to live.”  Id. at 4.
140 Among the Maasai, for example, the ritual leaders who officiate at ox sacrifices are expected to 
demonstrate supreme qualities of impartiality and fairness: they must adopt a humble demeanor and must 
avoid fighting, insults, or other divisive behavior.  Their age-mates must show them proper respect and must 
accept their mediation and obey their judgments.  See John G. Galaty, Ceremony and Society: The Poetics 
of Maasai Ritual, 18 Man 361-82, 370 (1983).
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understood as a precursor to, or symbolic of, the basic political idea that legitimate 
government must not play favorites, at least among persons of equal status.  At the same 
time, the priest’s share of the meal symbolizes the right of the government to be paid 
(through taxes or otherwise) for its contribution to preserving order and maintaining a fair 
allocation of the surplus.
Like other rituals, sacrifice displays elements of celebration.  Sacrificial meals are 
often joyful events in which family, friends, and others may join together in fellowship 
and enjoyment.  The celebration of sacrifice is an indication that the ritual has succeeded 
in its function aligning personal identity with social role.  Sacrifice is an expression of 
solidarity and mutual support.  It celebrates the perception that the participants are good 
citizens – that is, people whose personal identities are strongly identified with the basic 
political ideals of the society in which they live.
Sacrificial rituals are also fraught with violence.  The violence in the sacrificial 
ritual is explicit, since the core of the rite is the killing of an animal.  Violence may also 
be present in the form of a diffuse but palpable sense of danger – as expressed, for 
example, in the fear that if the ritual is not performed according to the precise ritual 
specifications, the gods being summoned will become angry and exact vengeance.  The 
underlying theoretical or mythological framework of sacrifice is also often structured 
 In the case of ancient Israelite sacrifice, the impartiality of the priests was coded, in part, in the 
representation of the Levites as a specially qualified caste of ritual officials.  To reinforce the idea of 
Levites as impartial and unbiased, the Bible recounts that they alone of all the tribes received no share in the 
allotment of lands after the conquest of Canaan.  As a landless tribe, the Levites were insulated from the 
most important interest that would tend to separate groups within the society – the competition over 
territory and disputes about boundaries.  Levites are described as guests in the territories of the various 
tribes; and in this capacity, they had a powerful interest in maintaining impartiality as between all the 
competing interests in the broader culture.
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around themes of violence.141  The violence of sacrifice can be understood, in part, as 
reflecting what is being given up by a member of society, who agrees by virtue of his 
membership to forego the impulse to take more than his socially sanctioned share of the 
wealth.  This is the violence of the rule of law.  Although we tend to think of the rule of 
law as benign, in fact it is imposed on us with violence. The rule of law depends on the 
state’s claim to a monopoly over the use of coercive force.  If I attempted to get more than 
my fair share of the social resources – for example by engaging in strong-arm robberies 
on the street – I would quickly be apprehended and punished by the coercive apparatus of 
state power.142
C.  Rituals of Restoration
Cultures may do more than provide “booster shots” to maintain the identity-
shaping efficacy of initiations.  Societies that rely heavily on ritual often recognize that 
the social identity as defined by ritual is fragile.  People may deviate from the social role 
established by the ritual process.  To deal with such cases, societies often provide rituals 
of restoration. The purpose of these rituals is to restore the normal condition of a person 
when it has been compromised by some error or offense.143   These rituals purport to 
141 For example, Vedic rituals of animal sacrifice are a series of precise, comprehensive and 
exhaustive rules that dictate each element of a celebrant’s behavior.  The rules themselves do not explicitly 
convey violence.  But the rules are explained by a mythology that, as J.C. Heesterman describes in his book, 
The Broken World of Sacrifice, “speak of an entirely different order.  They continually refer to conflict, 
contest, and battle.” J.C. Heesterman, The Broken World of Sacrifice: Essays in Ancient Indian Ritual 48 
(1993).
142 The more diffuse elements of the violence of ritual may reflect deeper social anxieties about the 
fragility of the social compact.  If the sacrificial ritual does not accomplish its function of bonding personal 
identities to the social role of citizens, there is a danger that the rule of law will break down into a war of all 
against all.  The detail and specificity of the rules regarding the proper conduct of the ritual may be one 
measure of the extent of anxieties about this danger in some societies.
143 See Luc de Heusch, Sacrifice in Africa: A Structuralist Approach 5 (Linda O’Brien and Alice 
Morton, trs. 1985)(one common feature of sacrificial rites is to “restore the normal physical condition of 
man – his health, or his status – which has been compromised by some ‘offense.’).
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realign the individual and social identities, and thereby reduce the threat to society that 
the continued existence of a disparity between these identities would create.
1.   Purification
Purification ceremonies are classic rituals of restoration.  They deal with the 
polarity, found in various ways in many cultures, between purity and pollution.  As 
described by Mary Douglas, the concept of pollution relates to some sense of things being 
out of place – of objects crossing boundaries into regions where they do not belong.144
The perception of things crossing boundaries creates a sense of anxiety because it 
suggests a threat to the basic categories that structure a people’s sense of the natural 
order. We may hypothesize that in the dialectic of purity and pollution, some cultures 
code the risk that people will cease to experience their ritually-prescribed social role as 
congruent with their personal identities, and therefore will revert to ritually “impure” 
behaviors that are inconsistent with the social ideal.  In the event that pollution occurs, 
these societies prescribe ritual mechanisms – which must be followed precisely – to 
restore purity and ward off the risk if retribution or harm.145
A noteworthy feature of purification rituals is that they often deal with inadvertent 
boundary crossings.146 Thus, in the case of purification rituals, the problem being 
addressed is somewhat different than in other rituals of restoration.  In a purification 
ritual, the subject has usually not intended the disjunction between personal identity and 
social role.  Rather, in the usual case, the problem occurs because the role fell away from 
144 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger:  An Analysis of the Concept of Pollution and Taboo  (1966).
145 See Alfred R. Radcliffe-Brown, Social Sanctions, in Alfred R. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and 
Function in Primitive Society 205-211 (1952).
146 For example, if a culture views a menstruating woman as taboo for men, any contact with her, 
however inadvertent, may be viewed as polluting.  People do not want to experience pollution.
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the individual – that is, the individual, who wishes to remain in a socially appropriate 
role, finds himself or herself in a different role as a result of an accidental or negligent 
pollution.  The purification ritual restores the congruence between individual identity and 
social role, not by effecting changes in the person, but by changing the social role that 
person occupies, and thus restoring the person to a status which he or she had previously 
occupied.
Because the subjects of most purification rituals do not knowingly violate taboos 
and wish to return to their appropriate social roles, we do not expect to see large amounts 
of violence in the performance of these rites.147  Violence is not needed because the 
subject’s personal identity is consonant with the prescribed role.  We are not likely to 
observe large amounts of celebration in purification rituals either.  Since purification 
merely gives back to an individual something that he or she once had but lost, the 
restoration of the social role is not a cause for the same type of celebration as might be 
indicated, for example, if the person was assuming a new and desirable social role.  Thus, 
purification rituals are likely to be technical in spirit rather than violent or celebratory.
2.  Confession
Another ritual of restoration is that of confession and absolution.  These rituals 
invite the individual to own up to, and to abjure, certain socially disapproved behaviors.  
Atonement or expiation associated with confession allow the person to obtain 
147 Violence can however be expected to play a role when the subject has knowingly caused his own 
pollution and displays an unwillingness to correct the matter voluntarily.
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dispensation from the punishment that would otherwise follow from his or her bad 
behavior.148
An important function of confession is to deal with a problem that the emotion of 
shame creates for maintaining alignment between individual identity and social role.  
Shame is an exceedingly painful emotion which, if it works properly within a ritual 
context, will deter people from behaving in role-inconsistent ways.  But because shame 
depends in its structure on the perception of others observing the individual, it also 
encourages people to disguise or hide the fact that their personal identities may have 
deviated from their social role.  When people hide this fact, it becomes difficult for the 
culture to detect, or to correct, failures in the ritual process.  Worse yet, because shame 
affects self-esteem negatively, it can contribute to a downward spiral in which people 
increasingly abandon control over their behavior and become “shameless.”  In the worst 
case, shame may result in deviant subcultures that offer alternative social roles destructive 
to the roles prescribed by the broader culture.149  Confession is a means by which a 
society can manage the risk that, because of shame, people will hide deviations between 
personal identity and social role.  Confessions induce people to overcome shame, admit 
their shortcomings, and experience a degree of sincerity in their behavior.
Rituals of confession do not appear to reflect high degrees of either celebration or 
violence. Confessing one’s sins or misdeeds is not ordinarily a reason to rejoice.150
148 The isoma ritual of the Ndembu people, described by Victor Turner, is an example: this is a means 
by which women can overcome fertility problems thought to arise because the person has been quarrelsome 
or has been a member of a group riven by quarrels.  Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-
Structure 12 (1991).
149 See John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame, and Reintegration (1989).
150 However, confession does re-establish a relationship of sincerity between the individual and the 
broader society, and thus can be a precursor to other aspects of the ritual that are celebratory.  For example, 
the confession of sins by a believing Catholic is conducive to the experience of celebration during Mass.
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Because confession recognizes that personal identity and social role have fallen apart, we 
cannot expect ritual to express the felicity that is the hallmark of genuine alignment of 
identity and role.
Nor does confession appear a particularly violent act.  Since the individual who 
confesses is ostensibly a penitent – someone who wishes to be reconciled with his 
appropriate social role – the ritual does not recognize a need to enforce the adjustment of 
identity and role with coercive violence.  To use violence in this setting would be 
tantamount to denying that the individual is sincerely penitent, a strategy which would 
likely to detract from the efficacy of the confession.  Even if people are not actually very 
penitent, the very act of confessing and abjuring sins may instill a degree of remorse if it 
is not undermined by social meanings tending to deny its sincerity.  Yet penitence can be 
faked, and confessions are rarely completely voluntary.  Apparently for this reason, 
confessions can be tinged with violence.151  As Foucault observes, confession is “ritual 
that unfolds within a power relationship, for one does not confess without the presence 
(or virtual presence) of a partner who is not simply the interlocutor but the authority who 
requires the confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to judge, 
punish, forgive, console, and reconcile.”152
3.   Cure
Many societies maintain rituals for curing disease, demonic possession, or other 
negative bodily or mental conditions.153  In developed societies, at least during the past 
hundred years or so, these rituals have faded in importance as medical science has grown 
151 Consider the confessions of defendants in totalitarian state trials.
152 Michael Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, pp. 61-62 (1980).
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into a discipline that helps more people than it harms.  Yet in even the most developed 
countries people continue to make large expenditures in healing rituals and remedies.  
Pilgrims still travel to Lourdes, and thousands seek relief from faith healers, preachers, 
and practitioners of traditional medicine.  When we turn to pre-industrial societies, we 
observe even greater share of social wealth being expended on curative rituals. 
Some curative rituals can be understood and analyzed within the framework of 
this paper.  These rituals attempt to realign the subject’s personal identity with his or her 
proper social role.  They are classifiable as rituals of restoration because they seek to 
reestablish a proper social identity from which the person has fallen away.154  If 
successful, they can have a marked effect: the patient, emerging from the ritual, may even 
seem to “have developed a new personality.”155
Curative rituals that shape identity include cases where the patient’s condition is 
attributed to sin.156  Such people have fallen away from their social role as adults who 
behave appropriately according to the norms and values of the society.  In this case, the 
ritual process is likely to include confession and absolution, and thus to merge with the 
category discussed above.157
In other cases, the patient’s disease is attributed to the action of demons or other 
hostile forces invade their bodies or minds.  Here, the curative ritual is likely to encourage 
153 See generally Ari Kiev, ed., Magic, Faith, and Healing: Studies in Primitive Psychiatry Today 
(1964).
154 See, e.g., Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure 18 (1969)(isoma ritual 
of the Ndembu is intended to accomplish the “restoration” of the right relationship between matriliny and 
marriage; “reconstruction” of the conjugal relations between wife and husband, and “making the woman, 
and hence the marriage and the lineage, fruitful.”)
155 John Gillin, Magical Fright, in William Lessa and Evon Z. Vogt, Reader in Comparative Religion
361 (1958).
156 See Weston La Barre, Confession as Cathartic Therapy in American Indian Tribes, in Ari Kiev, 
ed., Magic, Faith, and Healing: Studies in Primitive Psychiatry Today 36-49 (1964).
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the subject to conceive of his or her problematic behaviors as being the actions of a 
foreign being.  The subject is then led to experience the invading agent as radically 
foreign to the subject’s identity, and thus feel disgust and horror at the situation.158  The 
subject then cooperates with the ritual practitioner in expelling the invader.  Any 
resistance to the expulsion is attributed to the demon rather than to the ritual subject, thus 
preserving the premise that the subject’s “true” identity wishes to re-establish control.
The role of identity manipulation in curative rituals is nicely illustrated in an 
exorcism rite from southern India described in a recent paper by Isabelle Nabokov.159
The typical subject of these exorcisms is a young woman who is unhappy in her marriage 
and sexually rejecting of her husband.  Diagnosed with demonic possession, she is led to 
a shrine where she is required to fast and engage in other purifying activities.  During the 
ritual itself, the demon inside her is badgered by exorcists who apply “extreme forms of 
pressure” including escalating levels of “verbal abuse and physical violence.”  Eventually 
the demon makes an appearance.  The demon – whose name and personal history often 
bear an uncanny resemblance to the victim’s own circumstances – confesses that it is he 
who caused the confusion in the marriage and rendered the victim apathetic, aggressive 
and childless.  At the culmination of the ritual, an exorcist tears the head off a chicken 
and shoves the bloody neck into the victim’s mouth, inducing the demon to leave her 
body.  Nabokov argues that this ritual functions as a device for controlling a woman’s 
desire for forbidden sexuality.  Through the exorcism, the subject is induced to identify 
157 See text accompanying notes xx-xx infra.
158 Thus, as in the Sinhalese exorcism rite, the affected individual is required to publicly reject the 
introjected agent in the presence of kin and neighbors.  See S.J. Tambiah, A Performative Approach to 
Ritual, 65 Proceedings of the British Academy 113, 143-44 (1979).
159 Isabelle Nabokov, Expel the Lover, Recover the Wife: Symbolic Analysis of a South Indian 
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that desire with a demon who is experienced as evil and foreign.  The goal of the ritual is 
“forcibly to remove the [demon] from the woman’s head and to make her accept that her 
husband, and not the demon, is her rightful lover.”160  The ritual subject is thereby 
induced to return to the “safety and structure of the patriarchal family fold and women’s 
proper role in it.”  This ritual, in other words, is a form of psychic manipulation.  It 
responds to the perception that a ritual of reformation – marriage – has not been effective 
at permanently aligning the woman’s personal identity and her social role.  The exorcism 
induces the subject to experience as profoundly foreign and disgusting that part of herself 
which is inconsistent with the social role.  Through the exorcism, the subject is induced to 
expel that part of her identity and thereby to reassume her “proper” role as a married 
woman within the framework of that culture’s definition for how such a person should 
behave.
As this example illustrates, curative rituals are often characterized by violence. 
They may involve assaults on demons or other supernatural beings who are terrifying, 
powerful, and loathsome. If sorcery is viewed as the source of the person’s affliction, the 
culture may employ counter-spells and violence against the suspected evildoer.161  The 
presence of violence in these rituals would be expected given that the function of the 
ritual is to return the individual to his or her social role by expelling or destroying the 
force that is causing the deviant behavior.  The level of violence, moreover, may be 
particularly large because of the fact that the ritual process has failed to accomplish its 
Exorcism, 3 Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 297-316 (1997).
160 Isabelle Nabokov, Expel the Lover, Recover the Wife: Symbolic Analysis of a South Indian 
Exorcism, 3 Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 297-316 (1997)(emphasis supplied).
161 See Ari Kiev, The Study of Folk Psychiatry, in Ari Kiev, ed., Magic, Faith, and Healing: Studies 
in Primitive Psychiatry Today 12 (1964).
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end of ensuring alignment of personal identity and social role.  Having failed once, the 
risk that the process will fail again is enhanced.
Although violence is likely to be the principal motif of curative rituals, celebration 
may also be displayed.  If celebration occurs, it will appear towards the end of the 
process, as a mark that the ritual has accomplish its intended goal of curing the 
misalignment of identity and role.162
III.   The Relationship between Ritual, Law and Norms in Controlling Behavior 
Having presented a theory of ritual as a form of social control, we are now in a 
position to develop its points of similarity and contrast with two other principal systems 
of social control, social norms and law.  
Ritual is related to and interpenetrates with both social norms and law.163  Norms 
may be a source of law – as in the case of rules adopting the customs of merchants in the 
trade.164  Law also may be a source of norms, or of ritual – for example, Congress can 
enact a statute requiring the celebration of a patriotic holiday.  Law may attempt to 
restrict165 or mandate166 rituals.  Rituals also condition law.  Legal proceedings contain 
many elements of ritual – the robes of the judges, the design of courtrooms, the 
162 For example, the isoma ritual of the Ndembu – which is performed in order to cure women’s 
gynecological and reproductive problems – culminates in the ku-tumbuka, a festive dance that celebrates the 
woman’s return to her proper social role as wife and mother. See Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: 
Structure and Anti-Structure 14 (1969).
163 The degree to which law asserts authority over ritual is a function, in part, of the nature of the 
government.  In liberal democracies, the power of law either to compel or to prohibit the observance of 
rituals is limited, whereas in other systems – for example, theocratic states – the law plays a much greater 
role.
164 Se Richard A. Epstein, The Path to the T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the 
Law of Tort, 21 Journal of Legal Studies 1 (1992).
165 See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)(upholding state’s power to subject 
sacramental use of peyote to general criminal prohibition on use of the substance); Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City Of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)(invalidating city ordinance banning ritual 
sacrifice of animals).
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requirements of formalized respect for the court. Ritual performances are governed by
norms, and rituals may influence people to observe norms.167
But rituals, laws, and social norms are related on a deeper level.    All three 
respond to the problem of social organization described at the beginning of this paper: the 
fact that society can be made better off if institutions police against the tendency of its 
members to take opportunistic advantage of the basic arrangements that make society 
possible in the first place.  
We have seen the rituals control behavior by assigning social roles and 
influencing the ritual subject, as well as others in the society, to accept the roles so 
assigned as a natural and appropriate part of the subject’s identity.  Laws control 
undesirable self-interested behavior by prohibiting it, and by providing state sanctions to 
prevent, detect, and correct violations.168  Social norms also control undesirable self-
interested behavior by specifying rules and standards for conduct, enforced by private 
parties outside the formal legal process. 169
166 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)(invalidating requirement 
of saluting the flag in public school).
167 A point stressed in Andrew J. Cappel, Bringing Cultural Practice into Law: Ritual and Social 
Norms, 43 Santa Clara Law Review 389, passim (2003).
168 So fundamental are these institutions to the project of social control through law, that the threat of 
coercion by government agents claiming a monopoly over the legitimate use of force is sometimes said to 
be the very touchstone of “law.” See generally H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 20-25 (2d ed. 
1994)(discussing Austinian notion that law consists of orders backed by threats issued by the sovereign).  
This is, of course, not the complete story.  People also obey the law, in part, because they believe in it, or 
because, even if they do not believe in the law, they accept it as the judgment of a political process which 
they believe to be legitimate.
169 Norms serve other functions than controlling self-interested behavior, of course.  For example, 
sometimes, they may simply offer efficient conventions for the organizing of human behavior – such as the 
norm that pedestrians pass one another on the right – at least in countries with right-hand side driving rules.
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In some cases, two or more of these systems may overlap in coverage.170  For 
example, the police will ticket people who park in “handicapped” parking spots without a 
valid permit;171 but the regime of legal regulation is powerfully supplemented by private 
enforcement.172  Ritual may also command performance (or non-performance) of acts that 
are covered by norms or laws.  For example, the marriage ritual commands that the 
partners honor one another by remaining sexually faithful.  Sexual fidelity within 
marriage is also a salient social norm.173  And laws long prohibited adultery.  Laws, 
norms, and ritual combined to sanction the conduct.174
In other cases, the task of controlling conduct may be restricted to one or another 
domain.  For example, in some societies – including ours – a limited amount of tax fraud 
does not violate either a social norm or the identity of citizenship that rituals enjoin.  
People are rarely censured when they fail to pay sales tax on items ordered out of state, 
even if the law requires that they report and pay.  Enforcement here occurs in the legal 
realm if it occurs at all.  Neither law nor ritual requires that people stand to the right on 
elevators if they are not climbing or descending; but in some societies, this practice has 
developed as a widely observed social norm.  Neither law nor social norms require that 
people engage in heroic or extraordinary efforts on behalf of others if they have not 
170 See Richard A. Posner, Frontiers of Legal Theory (2001)(laws and norms sometimes overlap in 
coverage).
171 See Geoffrey P. Miller and Lori S. Singer, Handicapped Parking, 29 Hofstra Law Review 81 
(2000).
172 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Norm Enforcement in a Non-cooperative Setting (manuscript 2001).
173 See generally Elizabeth Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 Virginia 
Law Review 1901 (2000).
174 The fact that high rates of adultery occur, notwithstanding the overlapping prohibitions of laws, 
norms, and ritual, is one illustration of the fact that no program of social control is likely to provide 
complete deterrence.
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agreed to do so in advance; but such conduct may be demanded as a result of the social 
role that is instilled by ritual.
Other things equal, a given society is likely to opt, at least roughly, for a mix of 
ritual, laws and norms that achieves the highest surplus of social benefit over social costs.  
The tradeoff is complex and will vary depending on the particular characteristics of a 
given society.  However, some general observations appear salient.  First, we may 
compare ritual, laws, and norms along the dimension of the costs of enforcement.  As 
compared with other forms of social control, ritual has certain advantages here.  If ritual 
is effective, it shapes a person’s identity in such a way that he or she experiences 
satisfaction from behaving in accordance with the social role and abhors behaviors that 
contravenes that role.  Such an individual will act in socially approved ways on his or her 
own, without being compelled to do so ex post, and, moreover, will encourage others to 
do so.175 Ritual, in other words, is essentially self-enforcing to the extent that members of 
the society come to experience their personal identities and the identities of others as 
congruent with the social roles defined in the ritual process.
Social norms may also be self-enforcing to some extent.  People sometimes 
internalize norms, so that they comply with the rules even when they are not compelled to 
do so by threat of ex post sanction.  To this extent, social norms, like behaviors demanded 
by ritually established social identities, may be self-enforcing.  But many social norms are 
not internalized, and require external sanction to be effective.  Moreover, internalizing a 
social norm may be an intellectual process in which the individual comes to believe that 
175 See Amartya Sen, Goals, Commitment, and Identity, 1 Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization 341, 349 (1985)(observing that if individual identity is aligned with social welfare, the 
prisoners dilemma can be overcome without formal contract and enforcement.)
68
the norm is something that ought to be followed because doing so is good for the society.  
Such intellectual processes may be effective at governing behavior in some people, but 
they are unlikely to be as effective as control of behavior through identity.  People often 
act contrary to their professed values and beliefs – especially if they can avoid being 
called to account for doing so.  In contrast, people rarely act contrary to their sense of 
identity, because identity itself is the wellspring of action.  Thus, even people who have 
internalized social norms on an intellectual level are often at risk for deviating from those 
norms when the incentives to deviate are large.  The upshot is that social norms are less 
likely to be self-policing than are rituals. For a social norm to be effective, it may be 
necessary for members of the group to monitor others to ensure that they are complying 
with the rules, and to engage in costly sanctioning behavior (rebuking or shaming) if they 
detect violations.176
Law, along this continuum, appears to require the greatest expenditures on ex post 
enforcement.  While some abide by the law because they internalize it and believe it is 
right to do so, the fact that a particular rule is embodied in law is often seen as little 
reason to comply.  People rarely insist that law is worthy of respect and compliance 
simply because it is the law, without reference to its underlying justifications. Where the 
law deviates from behaviors that people would otherwise follow, it usually has little 
effect beyond the threat of ex post sanctions.  And when people follow the law for reasons 
other than fear of being caught and sanctioned if they disobey, it is often because the law 
embodies norms of behavior that they would follow in any event.  To the extent that legal 
176 For discussions of social sanctions for norm violations, see Richard Posner and Eric Rasmussen, 
Creating and Enforcing Norms with Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 International Review of Law and 
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rules are not enforced by systems of social norms or ritual, they require costly 
enforcement devices.
Thus, other things equal, ritual tends to be cheap to enforce ex post, social norms 
tend to be relatively inexpensive to enforce (but more expensive than ritual); and law 
tends to be expensive relative to the other two means for social control.  This principle 
suggests that where ex post enforcement is costly, ritual is likely to assume relatively 
greater importance, but where ex post enforcement is cheap, ritual is likely to have 
relatively less importance.  Thus, we are likely to see greater reliance on ritual in the case 
of behaviors that are difficult for third parties to observe, or where it is difficult because 
of the factual complexity of a situation to specify rules with reasonably determinate 
application.  Ritual is also likely to assume greater importance relative to law when the 
apparatus of legal enforcement is ineffective (due to corruption, weak government, or 
disrespect for the law).  On the other hand, where it is relatively inexpensive to monitor 
behaviors, where defined rules of behavior can be set forth in advance with reasonable 
clarity, or where government enforcement is strong and respected, ritual is likely to play a 
relatively smaller role.  
While ritual enjoys an advantage over laws and norms with respect to the costs of 
enforcement, it is inferior to these alternative forms of social control with respect to the 
costs of establishing itself in the first place.  Ritual, as we have seen, often requires large 
social expenditures ex ante.  Moreover, because ritual shapes identities, it can be 
understood, in some sense, as harming the individuals who are its subjects – indeed, this 
element of harm appears to be coded in the ritual process itself, through the symbolic 
Economics 369-82 (1999); Norm Enforcement in The Public Sphere: The Case of Handicapped Parking, 71 
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performance of violent acts.  And ritual, because it is conservative – i.e., not easily 
changed or revised – can impose limits on a society’s ability to adapt to shocks, and in 
particular to cope with rapid technological change.
Compared with ritual, social norms appear somewhat cheaper to establish ex ante.  
We do not, in fact, have a well-developed theory for how social norms evolve and 
develop.  Some norms appear to emerge spontaneously as a result of the need for people 
to coordinate their activities within a society (e.g., a norm for passing on the right).  
Others may have evolved from a concrete historical event (where did baseball’s tradition 
of playing “Take Me out to the Ballgame” during the seventh inning stretch originate?).  
Still other norms may arise as a result of manipulation by interest groups or “norm 
entrepreneurs.”177  This process of establishing social norms is certainly not costless, and 
may involve “rent seeking” expenditures among competing interest groups seeking 
alternative norms.178  However, compared with rituals, social norms appear in general to 
be more flexible for society, and less intrusive in the lives of individuals.
Law, it would appear, is less costly ex ante than either norms or rituals.  This is 
not to say that law is cheap in any absolute sense.  Competing interest groups expend 
social resources in lobbying, litigating, or otherwise seeking governmental actions 
favorable to their interests.  Candidates campaign for office, which especially in recent 
years can be an expensive undertaking.  Laws require legislatures, staffs, budgets for 
publication and promulgation, and so on.  Nevertheless, these costs are probably lower 
George Washington Law Review 895-933 (2004).
177 The phrase is from Cass Sunstein.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 
Colum. L. Rev. 903, 912 (1996).
71
than the costs of establishing social norms or rituals with comparable effects on behavior 
and social welfare.  Further, laws do not impose the costs on individuals that are exacted 
in the ritual process and that are present, although to a much lesser degree, in the process 
by which social norms are established.  Laws do not, in general, seek to influence or 
control people’s identities or assign social roles to involuntary subjects.  The fact a law is 
on the books does not change a person’s identity, even though he or she may elect to 
comply with it.  Thus, laws do not impose the psychic violence on individuals of the sort 
that can be observed in some rituals.
What predictions, if any, can we make about the expected incidence of laws, 
rituals, and norms in different sorts of societies?  Any such predictions must be 
entertained with caution, given the inevitable complexities of the issues.  The following, 
however, appear to be relatively plausible in light of the concept of ritual as social 
control.  First, we are likely to observe a higher ratio of ritual to law in smaller, relatively 
homogenous groups than in larger groups.  In smaller groups, ritual is likely to be more 
efficacious at shaping identity than in larger groups, where the effect of ritual at providing 
people with a coherent system of meaning and social roles is likely to be dissipated by the 
impact of other cultural systems and values.179  Further, as we have seen, the lack of 
effective partner choice in smaller societies places a premium on identity change through 
ritual as a means for controlling self-interested behavior.180  Conversely, we are likely to 
178 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Norms and Interests, __ Hofstra Law Review __ (forthcoming 2004).  On 
rent-seeking, see Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Public Goods and the Theory of Groups
(1971).
179 See David Lockwood, Solidarity and Schism (1990)(distinguishing between “social integration,” 
which binds the individual to the group through moralizing and ritual, and “system integration,” which 
produces social order by ensuring that the various social subsystems are well integrated).  I thank David 
Garland for bringing Lockwood’s work to my attention.
180 See text accompanying notes xx-xx supra.
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observe relatively more law in broader, culturally diverse groups where ritual is likely to 
have less effect.181
Ritual is likely to play a larger role in societies that are relatively insulated from 
technological change, and a smaller role in societies that are in the midst of rapid 
development.  The reason is that ritual tends to fix social relationships – including social 
relationships that structure technological production – in a relatively rigid form.  The 
rigidity of ritual is by no means absolute; rituals can and do evolve in response to changed 
circumstances.  But ritual is clearly less flexible than other means of social control, such 
as law.  When social relationships are fixed, the culture is likely to resist rapid 
technological change and to experience instability in the face of technological change that 
does occur.182
We are likely to observe relatively more ritual, and less law, in societies where the 
political system is unstable or the legal system is weak.  It is perhaps for this reason that 
we observe a certain degree of ritualization occurring in impoverished neighborhoods 
where the effectiveness of state control is low.  In such neighborhoods, organized religion 
is likely to play an important role, and outlaw groups, such as gangs, may implement their 
own forms of ritual in order to provide their members with incentives to engage in 
behaviors that are beneficial to the gangs, even if harmful to the broader society.
181 In fact this appears to hold true, at least for rituals classified as rites of passage. Turner notes that 
such rituals “are found in all societies but tend to reach their maximal expression in small-scale, relatively 
stable and cyclical societies, where change is bound up with biological and meteorological rhythms and 
recurrences rather than with technological innovations.”  Victor Turner, The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of 
Ndembu Ritual 8 (1967).
182 The hypothesis that less technologically sophisticated cultures tend to be more ritualized is borne 
out in observation .  See Max Gluckman, Les Rites de Passage, in Max Gluckman, ed., Essays on the Ritual 
of Social Relations 2 (1962)(observing that tribal society displays greater ritualization than modern society).
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As to norms, it is hard to make a prediction based on technological and economic 
conditions.  Like rituals, norms are, other things equal, more likely to play an important 
role in small social groups where people deal with one another through repeat 
interactions, since in such settings, the incentives to behave cooperatively with others is 
larger.  Moreover, because social norms appear less “sticky” than rituals – they are 
susceptible to relatively rapid change in response to changed conditions – norms appear 
better adapted than rituals to cope with rapid technological developments.  Thus, social 
norms continue to govern large domains of behavior even in modern industrial societies. 
Because these considerations cut in somewhat different directions, it is difficult to make a 
firm prediction as to how changes in social conditions will affect the importance of social 
norms as devices of social control.
Regardless of the particular society involved, the trade-off between ritual, norms 
and law is unlikely to generate a “corner solution.”   That is, we are unlikely to see any 
society opting for all ritual, all law, or all norms; instead, we are likely to observe varying 
mixes in different societies.  In fact, that is what we do observe: even in highly advanced 
industrial societies, rituals still shape identities, while even in pre-industrial tribal 
cultures, principles of tribal law usually play a role in structuring social relations and 
resolving disputes.  Social norms can be observed at work in societies of all levels of 
sophistication and development.
Conclusion
This paper has provided a legal theory of ritual.  It argues that one – although not 
the exclusive – role of ritual is to control behavior by assigning social roles and aligning 
individual identities with social roles so assigned.  Rituals employ an impressively varied 
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and effective arsenal of strategies that appear useful at reaching people at the level where 
their senses of identity are susceptible to change. Other things equal, many societies are 
likely to display a degree of ritual efficiency, in the sense that social expenditures on 
ritual will approximate the point where the marginal costs of an additional unit of 
expenditure equal the marginal benefits.
Ritual provides both “carrots” and “sticks” to induce the proper alignment of 
individual and social identities.  From the positive point of view, rituals offer celebration 
to people who have successfully adjusted their sense of individual identity to the 
prescribed social role and to others who recognize and endorse this change.  On the other 
hand, the social role is compulsory, not only for the individual asked to assume it, but 
also for everyone else whose obligation is to respect the rights and privileges that the role 
confers.  The compulsory nature of ritual – the “stick” – is reflected in the violence that is 
explicit or implicit in many rituals.
Because rituals are compulsory, they require justification.  Rituals are legitimated 
in several ways, including the fact that they offer a model of the cosmos through which 
participants can understand their lives, that they are performed, that they remain relatively 
stable over long periods of time, and that they are elaborated by narratives, myths, 
etymologies, and intellectual theories.  
The theory of ritual as social control suggests the utility of a typology based on the 
nature of the control being exercised.  Rituals of reformation – including initiation rites, 
marriages, and installation ceremonies – seek to mold individual identities into new social 
roles.  Rituals of renewal – such as ordinary services, patriotic ceremonies, and sacrificial 
rituals – act as “booster shots” that reinforce the connection between  personal identity 
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and social role.  Rituals of restoration – including purification, confession, and cure – are 
corrective in nature: they bring individual identity back into alignment into the social role 
when there has been a break or threat of break between the two.
The aspect of ritual discussed in this paper can be referred to as its “legal
function” because its effect, at the most general level, is similar to the effect of laws and 
social norms.  Laws, norms, and rituals all serve the general goal of preserving the fabric 
of social cooperation, and deterring the tendency that individuals would otherwise have to 
defect from the social compact when doing so would serve their opportunistic self 
interest.  Rituals, however, accomplish this function in somewhat different ways than 
laws or norms.  Rituals are cheap ex post because they are self-enforcing: people 
experience unpleasant emotions when they act against their sense of personal identity, 
and accordingly they usually do not do so.  Norms and laws are more costly to enforce 
because some external sanctioning mechanism – either ordinary people who rebuke the 
violator, or police, courts, and other legal institutions that impose a formal sanction for 
noncompliance.  On the other hand, the change in personal identities that appears to be an 
objective of ritual is costly for societies. Norms and laws appear to be less costly along 
this dimension.  Ritual is cheap to enforce ex post, but costly to impose ex ante.
The theory of the legal function of ritual generates several conjectures about the 
expected incidence of ritual, norms, and law across different cultural conditions.  
Societies are likely to expend more resources on ritual, relative to law, when they are 
small, homogenous and tight knit; when they are relatively insulated from technological 
change; and when they are politically unstable or undeveloped.  As to norms, theory does 
not offer definite predictions: they appear likely to play an important role across a wide 
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range of cultures and states of technological development.  A theory of social control that 
includes laws and norms should not be considered inclusive unless the influence of ritual 
is also considered.
